PARTIES:					ROBERT WILLIAM TAYLOR

						v

						TAN SENG KIAH

TITLE OF COURT:				SUPREME COURT (NT)

JURISDICTION:				SUPREME COURT EXERCISING 
						TERRITORY JURISDICTION

FILE NOS:					No. 231 of 1995

DELIVERED:					Darwin  18 December 1995

HEARING DATES:				14 and 15 December 1995

JUDGMENT OF:				Kearney J

CATCHWORDS:

Procedure - Supreme Court procedure - Bail and recognizances - Review of bail decision by way of rehearing - Whether hearing de novo.

Bail Act (NT), s36(3).

Builders Licensing Board v Sperway Constructions (Syd.) Pty Ltd (1976) 135 CLR 616, referred to.

Procedure - Supreme Court procedure - Bail and recognizances - Review of bail decision - Significance of hearsay evidence.

Bail Act (NT), s24(2).

Procedure - Supreme Court procedure - Bail and recognizances - Review of bail decision - Charges of narcotics offences under s233B of the Customs Act (Cth) - No presumption against bail - Relevant considerations.

Bail Act (NT), ss7A(1) and (2), 8(3) and 24(1) and (2) 
Bail Act 1978 (NSW), s8A(1)(b) and (2), referred to.
Bail Act 1977 (Vic), s4(2)(aa)(ii) and (iii), referred to.

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:					
	Applicant:				 Mr P Bannon QC
	Respondent:			 Mr I Barker QC

Solicitors:				
	Applicant:				 Australian Government Solicitor
	Respondent:			 Withnall & Cavanagh

Judgment category classification: A
Judgment ID Number:			 kea95049
Number of pages:				 17
kea95049

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
OF AUSTRALIA
AT DARWIN

No. 231 of 1995

IN THE MATTER OF the Bail Act

AND

IN THE MATTER OF a request for review of a bail decision by a Magistrate

BETWEEN:

ROBERT WILLIAM TAYLOR
		Applicant

AND

TAN SENG KIAH
		Respondent

CORAM:	KEARNEY J

	REASONS FOR RULING

	(Delivered 18 December 1995)

		The ruling on the request
		On 8 December 1995 Mr Trigg SM granted bail to the respondent, on certain conditions.  On 13 December the applicant filed a request that that decision be reviewed.  On 14 December the application was argued before me.  On 15 December I ruled orally as follows:
“I rule today on the request by Detective Sergeant Taylor, under section 36 of the Bail Act, to review the decision made by Mr Trigg, Stipendiary Magistrate, on last Friday, 8 December, to grant bail to the respondent, Tan Seng Kiah, on certain terms and conditions.

This request for a review was argued before me yesterday and I reserved my decision overnight.  Full reasons for the decision, which I now make, will be available on Monday afternoon, 18 December.

For the present, I record that I have taken into consideration, as far as they can reasonably be ascertained from the materials placed before me, two matters only.  

First, the probability of whether or not Mr Tan will appear in court in respect of the offence for which he is presently charged and in respect of which the question of bail is under consideration.  I have considered that probability having regard only to the matters specified in the various sub-paragraphs of paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of section 24 of the Bail Act.

The second matter that I have taken into consideration is the interest of Mr Tan himself in being on bail.  In doing so, I have had regard only to the matters specified in the various sub-paragraphs of paragraph (b) of subsection (1) of section 24 of the Bail Act.

In taking those matters into consideration, I have borne in mind that under section 8 of the Bail Act the offence with which Mr Tan is charged is such that he is entitled to be granted bail, in accordance with that Act, unless I am satisfied that I am justified in refusing bail to him, having considered the matters to which I have just referred.

Bearing Mr Tan’s entitlement [to bail] in mind, and having taken into consideration those matters to which I have just referred, I am satisfied that I am justified in refusing bail to him, and I now do so.  Accordingly, I make the following orders.

1.	The order of Mr Trigg, Stipendiary Magistrate, of 8 December 1995 granting bail to Mr Tan on certain conditions is revoked.

2.	Any money deposited with the court as a condition of that bail is to be promptly repaid to the person who deposited it.

3.	Any passports surrendered by Mr Tan as a condition of that bail are to be returned promptly to him.

4.	In lieu of the order of Mr Trigg, Stipendiary Magistrate, of 8 December granting bail to Mr Tan, bail is refused.

5.	Mr Tan is ordered to be taken into custody forthwith and remanded in custody until 10 o’clock on the morning of Thursday, 22 February 1996, when he is to be brought before the Court of Summary Jurisdiction at Darwin.

Those are the orders of the court.”

I now publish the “full reasons” referred to, of which the reasons of 15 December form part.
		The application for review
		On 14 December Mr Bannon QC of senior counsel for the applicant informed me that on 4 July 1995 the respondent had been charged with being knowingly concerned in the importation into Australia of prohibited imports, being a narcotic substance (heroin) of not less than the commercial quantity specified in Schedule VI of 1.5 kilograms.  The quantity was in fact some 21 kilograms.  The maximum penalty for this offence under s233B(1)(d) of the Customs Act 1901 (Cth) is life imprisonment; see s235(2)(c) of that Act.  It appears that when the respondent came before the Court of Summary Jurisdiction on 4 July 1995 he was remanded in custody until 8 December.  I assume that this lengthy adjournment of some 5 months was, at least in part, for the purpose of enabling the Police to prepare to present their case for the committal proceedings.  On 8 December (when the respondent was bailed) his case was listed to be mentioned again before the court on 22 February 1996.  Mr Bannon informed me that the Police would ask at that time that a date be set for the commencement of committal proceedings; he expected that that would be about May 1996.
		Mr Bannon sought to rely on the affidavit of Detective Constable White of 11 December 1995, as corrected in certain respects.  Mr Barker QC of senior counsel for the respondent objected to the admissibility of most of that affidavit, on various grounds.  
		Mr Barker submitted that since this was a “review” under s35 of the Act of a decision of a magistrate to grant bail, the applicant must show that the magistrate was wrong in doing so.  There is no record before me of the application before Mr Trigg SM. Section 36(3) of the Act provides:
“The review of a decision shall be by way of rehearing, and evidence or information in addition to, or in substitution for, the evidence or information given or obtained on the making of the decision may be given or obtained on the review.”

The term ‘rehearing’ in s36(3) was graphically described as a “Delphic utterance” by Mason J in Builders Licensing Board v Sperway Constructions (Syd) Pty Ltd (1976) 135 CLR 616 at p622.  The better view in my opinion, is, that the legislature intended by s36(3) that the review by way of rehearing be a hearing de novo directed to deciding whether bail should be granted, on the evidence and information presented at the review, and in accordance with the law as it stands at this time.
		The applicant does not have to show that the magistrate was wrong, but it is clear that he bears the onus of showing that bail should not be granted.  This is because the offence charged under s233B(1)(d) of the Customs Act is an offence to which s8(3) of the Act applies; it provides as far as relevant:
“... a person is entitled under this section to be granted bail in respect of an offence to which this section applies ... .”

I note in passing that in certain other jurisdictions  - see, for example, s8A(1)(b) and (2) of the Bail Act 1978 (NSW) and s4(2)(aa)(ii) and (iii) of the Bail Act 1977 (Vic) - the charge of an offence such as that faced by the respondent falls within their equivalent of s7A of the Act, ss(2) of which provides:
“A person accused of an offence to which this section applies is not to be granted bail unless the person satisfies an authorised member or court that bail should not be refused.”

In view of the presence within s7A(1) of the Act of certain offences within the Misuse of Drugs Act (NT), it may be that the failure to include the more serious offences under s233B of the Customs Act was overlooked when s7A was introduced last year.  I draw that matter to the attention of the legislature.  The law is clear as it stands that the respondent’s rights are governed by s8(3).
		One ground of objection was that the deponent had no personal knowledge of the purported facts to which he there deposed; his account was almost wholly hearsay.  This appears to be correct, but s24(2) of the Bail Act (“the Act”) provides that the -
“court may take into account any evidence or information which the ... court considers credible or trustworthy in the circumstances, including hearsay evidence.”

The question therefore is whether, despite the  hearsay nature of its contents,  the affidavit of 11 December contains information which is “credible or trustworthy” in the circumstances.  The deponent’s account of facts was clearly based on many observations by a number of Police officers engaged in the surveillance of a number of people, including the respondent, whom they suspected of being engaged in the importation of heroin.  I consider that it is not sufficient reason to object to the affidavit that its contents are of a hearsay nature.
		Mr Barker also objected to parts of the affidavit on the basis that they constituted mere argument, or prejudicial and unsupported allegations, or that they drew conclusions which were unsupported by and contrary to Police evidence which had already been supplied to the respondent.  I deal with these matters, when dealing with the particular matters to which objection was taken.
		Mr Barker submitted that, bearing in mind that the onus lay on the applicant to show that bail should be revoked, the affidavit of 11 December was entirely inadequate to discharge that onus.  In particular he objected to that part of par4 which reads:
“Mr Tan SK [the respondent] of all the defendants apprehended is the second most senior.  On the physical observations of the police involved it is clear he was instrumental in organising the transportation of the heroin to Australia and organising it being transported from the Teh Sun 16 to shore.”

He submitted that this passage amounted merely to argument and prejudicial assertion for which no factual basis was stated.  I upheld that submission.
		Mr Barker also objected to par5 which reads:
“The critical physical observations where [sic, were] Tan SK was the driver of the boat which went out to the Teh Sun 16 on 30 June 1995 which picked up two bags which were later found to contain heroin.  At the time he was the driver of the boat there was one other person, Mr LIM, in the boat.  The bags were brought back to Cullen Bay.  They were placed in a car NT registration 200 194 which was then left parked at the Frontier Hotel (under constant surveillance) until a search warrant was executed on it the next morning and the contents were later found to be heroin.  The occupants of the car were TAN PW AND LIM.  LIM was driving.”

He submitted that these assertions of fact were contrary to material supplied by the Police to the respondent; there was no evidence admissible against the respondent that he was in the dinghy which went out to the Teh Sun 16 and picked up the heroin.  There was an admission by a Mr Rusmanto then on board the Teh Sun 16 (Exhibit D5) that two Asian men had come to the ship in a small speed boat to collect the heroin, but he had not identified either of them; what Mr Rusmanto said in his record of interview was not evidence against the respondent, and in any event he had not identified the respondent.  I declined to reject par5.  
		Mr Barker objected to par6 which reads:
“Mr LIM has stated his role was to bring something into Australia.  It would come by ship to Darwin, he would go out and collect it, put it in his car and take it away.  For this he was to be paid $50,000 Singaporean.”

He submitted that this was not evidence against the respondent; it was irrelevant, offensively selective, and served to indicate that the affidavit of 11 December was thoroughly selective and unreliable.  If par6 was to be taken into account, he submitted that it should be noted that at p28 of Mr Lim’s record of interview (Exhibit D4) he had said that the respondent knew nothing about the heroin or what was happening when he (Mr Lim) in the dinghy pulled up the rope hanging off the Teh Sun 16 and cut from it the two bags containing the heroin.  In that record of interview Mr Lim said that the respondent at the time “had asked me what was going on”.  I declined to reject par6, but it was not pressed;  Mr Bannon proceeded to deal with the general topic in the oral examination of Detective Constable White.
		Mr Barker’s principal objection to pars8-28 was that they were hearsay.  I declined to reject those paragraphs on that basis, though Mr Bannon did not press par21.

		Mr Barker objected to par29 which reads as follows:
“On 29 June 1995 TAN SK arrives at Darwin Airport from Singapore at 4.00am.  He has in his possession at that time $6,000 Singapore dollars and $2,000 Australian dollars.  He catches a taxi directly to the Don Hotel where he goes to RUSMANTO’s room, room 237 at the Don Hotel.  He enters that room at 4.56am.  Later on in the day he is seen eating with TAN PW and LIM at the Galleria.  He is also seen walking in the Darwin City area with the two men.  They go to Thrifty Hire Car where LIM hires a car.  He then picks up TAN SK and TAN PW who are just waiting nearby.  During that day they go to Spot On Marine at Ludmilla Creek where TAN SK arranges for the purchase of a small aluminium dinghy with an outboard.  He tells the sales rep that he has purchased a property at Cullen Bay and required the dinghy to familiarise himself with the area.  The sale however was not finalised that day.  In the afternoon and also in the evening the three men are seen at the Casino and on that evening the three men are seen to return to the Frontier Hotel and it would appear that in fact the defendant stays at the Frontier Hotel.  That evening he doesn’t have a booking at the Don Hotel until the next day.”

Mr Barker’s first objection was that this  was hearsay; I do not accept that as a basis for rejection.  His particular objection was to the passage:
“He then picks up TAN SK and TAN PW who are just waiting nearby.  During that day they go to Spot On Marine at Ludmilla Creek where TAN SK arranges for the purchase of a small aluminium dinghy with an outboard.  He tells the sales rep that he has purchased a property at Cullen Bay and required the dinghy to familiarise himself with the area.”

Mr Barker noted that this was an important and serious allegation against the respondent; it sought to bring him closer to the alleged heroin importation, by asserting that he had arranged the purchase of the dinghy used to collect the heroin.  Mr Barker submitted that this allegation was unsupported by evidence, and was contrary both to what the Police had been told by other defendants, and to what the Police had already informed the Magistrates Court - that one of the other defendants had bought the dinghy.
		This last reference - to what the Police had told the Court - was a reference to a 13-page prosecution document headed “Facts for Court” (Exhibit P4) naming three defendants, Lim Chye Siew, Tan Poh What and Rusmanto Hartojo, and signed by Detective Constable Zuccato of the National Crime Authority.  I consider that this document was probably presented to the Magistrates Court in July 1995; I have no doubt that it was hurriedly prepared.   Par82 of Exhibit P4 states:
“On 30 June1995 LIM and TAN Poh What bought a 12 foot Stacer aluminium dinghy for $3000 from Spot On Marine, Ludmilla Creek, Darwin, Northern Territory.  It had a large cross painted on the linkpin and a similar cross painted on the engine cowling.  It had a Spot On Marine sticker on the engine.  They were then seen to drive the craft around the Cullen Bay area.  Contact of the craft was subsequently lost.  Around the same period TAN Seng Kiah was seen with both hire vehicles at the Cullen Bay Marina, Marina Boulevarde, Larkyah, Darwin Northern Territory.  Surveillance operatives noted that he was extremely agitated and was constantly looking out to sea and around the marina area.  Some time later LIM and TAN Poh What were sighted arriving at a beach area near Cullen Bay Marina.  TAN Poh What and LIM were then seen to carry two large dark coloured airline bags from the boat and load them into vehicle 400066.  They then departed the area and drove to the All Seasons Darwin Frontier Hotel and parked it in the car park.  They were further observed to catch a taxi to the Darwin Casino.  TAN Seng Kiah at the same time was seen to go to the boat and tie it to a pontoon at Cullen Bay Marina.  He then removed two large dark coloured airline bags and placed them into vehicle 465573.  TAN Seng Kiah was then observed to exit the marina and conduct extensive anti surveillance before parking the vehicle at The Don Hotel.  He then entered room 211 and exited wearing different clothing.  He then drove the vehicle to the Darwin Casino.”

Par 82 of Exhibit P4 is clearly inconsistent with par29 of the affidavit of 11 December 1995 (p8).  Mr Barker informed me that par82 was clearly based on Mr P W Tan’s record of interview (Exhibit D4) in which he said that he had bought the dinghy.  I did not consider that the contents of par29 of the affidavit of 11 December should be rejected on that account, as being without any credit or weight.
		Mr Barker also objected to par29 on the basis that a Mr Hanrahan had described the person who negotiated the purchase of this dinghy, in his statement of 25 July 1995 (Exhibit D2).  There had been no attempt by the Police to have Mr Hanrahan identify the respondent as that purchaser, by way of a Police lineup, or by identifying him by a collection of photographs.  That failure goes to weight, but I do not see it as a reason to reject par29.
		Mr Barker objected to pars30-37 as hearsay; I do not reject them for that reason.
		Par41 of the affidavit of 11 December 1995 reads:
“Throughout the time period of the surveillance Mr TAN SK and vehicles containing Mr TAN SK, performed anti surveillance manoeuvres.”

Mr Barker rightly objected to par41 as representing conclusions from facts unknown; I rejected it.
		Par42 reads:
“Mr Tan SK if granted bail is at risk of leaving the country or disappearing within Australia even without a passport.  He has the personal resources to do this and further when this is combined with the resources of the criminal enterprise he is alleged to be involved with, there can be no doubt he has the ability to flee the jurisdiction.”

Mr Barker rightly objected to this as mere argument, and prejudicial in its nature.  I rejected it.  Par43 reads:
“Further both Mr Foo Siang PIN and Lim Chye SIEW have convictions for Secret Society Activities.”

Mr Barker objected to this as entirely irrelevant and intended to cause maximum prejudice to the respondent.  I did not reject par43.
		Mr Bannon informed me that if and when the various defendants were committed for trial, they would be charged as having jointly taken part in the criminal enterprise of importing the heroin.   He submitted that evidence by a co-defendant of the respondent was relevant for the purpose of assessing the seriousness of the offence charged against the respondent, in terms of s24(1)(a)(iii) of the Act.  
		After hearing Mr Bannon’s submissions I ruled on Mr Barker’s objections along the lines I have generally indicated above.
		Detective Constable White then testified.  He said that Police officers had seen the respondent in the dinghy, travelling in the direction of the Teh Sun 16, on the evening the heroin was believed to have been collected from the ship.  Darkness prevented the officers from seeing whether the dinghy had arrived at that ship.  He identified the two persons in the dinghy as Mr Lim and the respondent, and said that the respondent was operating it.
		On the dinghy’s return to shore, the Police saw the bags (later found to contain heroin) unloaded from the dinghy and placed in the boot of a car, by Mr Lim.
		He said that the Police now had far more information than they had when the document “Facts for Court” was compiled.  
		As to par29 of his affidavit (p8) the witness said that it reflected the reports of Police who had been watching the respondent and the other two persons named therein, and the statements from two employees at Spot On Marine.  He wrongly said that the statement by one of those employees, Mr Senge (Exhibit D1), provided a detailed description of the three people.  
		There were a number of photographs of the respondent with Mr Lim and Mr P W Tan (Exhibit P2), taken at various locations including Mindil Beach, and at various times.
		Detective Constable White described what may fairly be described as “anti-surveillance” measures taken by the respondent and others, as they drove around Darwin.  
		I should record that I rejected what Detective White had to say about fears by the Police that the respondent may not appear in Court.  I consider that that is a question to be decided by the bail authority, on the material presented to it.  
		He noted the apparent clash between the respondent’s statement that he did not know a Mr Foo, and the Police photos of the two speaking together.   He said that they had spoken at some length.
		He also referred to the existence of a very considerable quantity of taped conversations, which were in the process of being translated and transcribed.  He was unable to say whether that process would be completed by 22 February 1996 when the respondent was next due to appear in Court.  I note that aspect as one of very considerable concern.  The respondent was charged on 4 July and was in custody for 5 months until 8 December.  Work should have been progressing on the tapes during that period.  It would be quite unacceptable that the respondent be kept in custody beyond 22 February 1996, unless the Police were able on that date to seek a date for the commencement of the hearing of committal proceedings as early as was practicable for the Court;  and on the basis that a sufficient time before that date of commencement they would provide to the respondent such part (if any) of the transcripts of the tapes as they propose to rely on in the case against him.  
		Detective Constable White agreed that the Police had no material at this time which indicated that the respondent was a party to conversations in which the importation of drugs was discussed.  
		I note the matters in the respondent’s record of interview of 3 July 1995, which were extracted in Exhibit P3.  In general terms the respondent there indicates that he was in Darwin at the relevant times for legitimate business purposes, as a result of an initiative by a Mr Pangestu.   In Darwin he was introduced to Mr Lim and drove around with Mr Pangestu for a few days.  He went back to Singapore on 28 May, returning to Australia on 22 June for business.  Mr Lim introduced him to Mr P W Tan.  He went back to Singapore and shortly afterwards returned to Darwin. There he was asked by Mr Pangestu to give $4000 to Mr Lim and $1000 to a Mr Ong. He was seeing Mr Ong about business.  On 30 June 1996 he went fishing with Mr Lim until about 6.30 - 7 o’clock, in a boat bought by Mr P W Tan.  He did not remember the ship Teh Sun 16, and he did not know Mr S P Foo.  
		Detective Constable White said that the respondent was a national of Singapore, about 40 years old, married with some children.  He said that the respondent had no ties to Australia or to the Territory.  His movements as traced has been as follows:  he was in Darwin 26-28 May, then returned to Singapore; in Perth 9-14 June, returning to Singapore on 14 or 15 June; in Darwin 22-25 June, then back to Singapore; he returned to Darwin on 29 June.  His passport showed many visits to Asian countries.  He was the general manager of  six companies.
		Of the other persons charged with having taken part in the importation of this consignment of heroin, Detective Constable White said that only one, an Australian citizen called Duong, had been bailed; he had not come to the notice of the Police until the very end of their surveillance activity. 
		In cross-examination by Mr Barker the witness said that par29 of his affidavit was based on the statements of Mr Senge and Mr Hanrahan of Spot On Marine (Exhibits D1 and D2).  He considered that par82 of the ‘Facts for Court’ was inaccurate in that three persons, including the respondent, were present when the dinghy was purchased from Spot On Marine.  He suggested that the money to purchase the dinghy was probably provided by the respondent who had brought considerable sums of cash into Australia on two occasions, and had provided cash to both Mr Lim and Mr P W Tan who, listening devices indicated, were both ‘down’ to a small amount of money.  
		He said that he had not read pp93-96 of Mr P W Tan’s record of interview (Exhibit D4), at the time he deposed to par30 of his affidavit.  He believed that the invoice for the purchase of the dinghy had been found in the respondent’s room.
		As to par5 of his affidavit, he had relied to a degree on what Mr Rusmanto had said in his record of interview.
		Mr Barker suggested to the witness that the fact that the respondent’s wife and children were now with him in Darwin constituted “ties” by the respondent to Darwin.  The witness rightly rejected that submission, and explained why:  the respondent’s wife and children are all Singapore nationals and could leave Australia at any time.
		The other evidence relied on by the applicant was that of Detective Senior Constable Oldfield who had interviewed Mr Hanrahan on 25 July 1995 about the purchase of the dinghy.  The description Mr Hanrahan gave of the man who did the talking in relation to that purchase, out of the three Asians then present, in Mr Oldfield’s opinion fitted the description of the respondent and not that of the other two, Mr Lim and Mr P W Tan.  He considered that par82 of the ‘Facts for Court’ was in error in identifying Mr P W Tan instead of the respondent, Mr S K Tan, as the person who bought the dinghy.
		I record that I have also read all of the affidavit evidence tendered by Mr Barker, Exhibits D1-D12, and given it due consideration.  
		Conclusions
		The onus lies on the applicant to show on the balance of probabilities that the grant of bail on 8 December should be revoked, and bail refused.  There is no presumption of any description against the grant of bail, in charges of narcotics offences under s233B of the Customs Act.  In considering the grant of bail, the only matters relevant for consideration are those set out in pars(a) and (b) of s24(1) of the Act, “so far as they can reasonably be ascertained” in accordance with s24(2).   Subpar(ii) of s24(1)(a) is not applicable here.  
		The respondent’s background is as a hardworking and apparently successful businessman, despite his bankruptcy in 1991.  There is nothing in that personal history or his described attitudes, which suggests that he is more likely than not to abscond.  His frequent overseas travels, do not of themselves suggest links with criminal activities.  I note that a purpose suggested by Mr Barker of the respondent seeking bail is, inter alia, to seek to run his business interests as best he can from Darwin.  
		The respondent has no community ties to Australia, though clearly he has very strong ties to Singapore.  He has no relevant prior criminal record.
		The nature of the offence charged against him indicates that it is very serious.  This is a relevant consideration under s24(1)(a)(iii) but, as Mr Barker rightly submitted, it does not raise some sort of notional presumption that a person, simply because he is charged with such an offence, is likely to abscond if granted bail.  
		In my opinion, the evidence against the respondent is strong, and cannot be viewed as unsatisfactory in nature.  There is powerful circumstantial evidence linking him to the importation of the heroin; this includes his presence in the dinghy on the occasion it went out - clearly to the Teh Sun 16 - when the heroin was collected and brought ashore.  The penalty he is likely to receive if convicted will be a lengthy period of imprisonment.
		There is no specific evidence indicating whether or not it is probable that the respondent will appear in court.   Bearing in mind the nature of the offence, and the evidence, I consider that the respondent would have nothing to lose by absconding from Australia.
		As to the matter referred in s24(1)(b)(i) I have already indicated that the Police should be properly prepared on 22 February 1996 to seek as early a committal date as is practicable for the court to appoint. Further, the Police must be in a position to supply to the respondent any taped material relating to him, sufficiently before the commencement of the committal to enable him to grapple with it. I agree with Mr Barker that the delay in the preparation of the transcript of tapes is a powerful factor; it is a matter of increasing weight, as far as bail is concerned, as time goes by.  
		My understanding is that subpar(ii) of s24(1)(b) was not strongly pressed.  
		I am fully conscious of the importance to an entrepreneur such as the accused of being free to attend to and administer his various business interests. I have considered the interests of the respondent, in par(b) of s24(1).
		On the whole I consider that it is probable that, if granted bail, the respondent would not appear in court to answer the charge against him.  
		On considering these matters, I am satisfied in terms of s8(2)(a) of the Act that I am justified in refusing bail.  
		These are the reasons for the conclusions expressed on 15 December and the orders then made.

_______________________________