kea95036.J

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
OF AUSTRALIA
AT DARWIN

						IN THE MATTER OF the Justices Act

						AND IN THE MATTER OF appeals against sentences imposed by the Court of Summary Jurisdiction at Darwin

No. JA20 of 1994			BETWEEN:

						DARREN JAMES KEELAN (also known as DARREN POCOCK)
							Appellant

						AND:

						ROBIN LAURENCE TRENERRY
							Respondent

AND

No. JA 21 of 1994		

						BETWEEN:

						DARREN JAMES KEELAN (also known as DARREN POCOCK)
							Appellant

						AND:

						GOTTLIEB THOMAS SVIKART
							Respondent

CORAM:   KEARNEY J

	REASONS FOR DECISION

	(Delivered 21 July 1995)

		I rule today on 2 appeals by the appellant against the severity of the totality of 8 sentences of imprisonment imposed on him by the Court of Summary Jurisdiction (herein "the Court") at Darwin on 20 May 1994.  By consent, the appeals were heard together.
		The sentences under appeal
		It is desirable to set out the sentences and the orders made by the Court as to their service.  The sentences were imposed after the appellant pleaded guilty to 11 offences.  Three were firearm related offences; the sentences imposed therefor are not the subject of appeal.

		(1)	The sentences the subject of appeal No.JA21 of 1994
		By Notice of Appeal dated 20 May 1994 the appellant appealed against the following 3 sentences:-
		(a)	3 months imprisonment for each of the following offences:
			(i)	that at Litchfield Park on 8 February 1994 without reasonable excuse, he interfered or tampered with a vehicle, namely Toyota sedan NT 500-261, without the consent of the owner or person in lawful charge thereof.  This offence under s49A(1)(a) of the Summary Offences Act (NT) carries a maximum punishment of  6 months imprisonment, or a fine of $1000, or both.
			(ii)	that, at Litchfield Park on the same day he committed a similar offence in relation to a Ford Station Wagon NT 439-313. 
		(b)	4 months imprisonment for stealing a leather wallet suede money belt containing $300.00, $503.00 US and a quantity of foreign money and coins, at Litchfield Park on 8 February 1994.  This offence under Code s210 carries a maximum punishment of 7 years imprisonment.
		The Court implicitly indicated that all of the above sentences were to be served concurrently.

		(2)	The sentences the subject of appeal No.JA20 of 1994
		By Notice of Appeal dated 20 May 1994 the appellant appealed against the following 5 sentences:-
		(a)	3 months imprisonment for each of the following offences:-
			(i)	that at the Casuarina Beach carpark in Darwin on 11 March 1994, without reasonable excuse, he interfered or tampered with a vehicle, namely, Holden Utility NT 439-876, without the consent of the owner or person in lawful charge thereof.  As earlier noted, this offence under s49A(1)(a) of the Summary Offences Act (NT) carries a maximum punishment of 6 months imprisonment, or a fine of $1000, or both.
			(ii)	that he unlawfully damaged property, namely, the door lock of the above Holden Utility, to the value of $50.00.  This offence under Code s251 carries a maximum punishment of 2 years imprisonment.
			(iii)	that at Lee Point carpark in Darwin on the same day, without reasonable excuse, he interfered or tampered with a second vehicle, namely, a Hiace Twin Cab NT 285-117, without the consent of the owner or person in lawful custody thereof.  
			(iv)	that he unlawfully damaged property, namely, the door lock of the above Hiace Twin Cab, to the value of $50.00.  
		(b)	2 months imprisonment for having in his possession at Darwin on 11 March 1994 a fishing net and mini car tyre compressor, reasonably suspected of having been stolen or unlawfully obtained.  This offence under s61 of the Summary Offences Act (NT) carries a maximum punishment of 12 months imprisonment, or a fine of $2000.

		The Court directed that these 5 sentences be served concurrently.  The Court clearly further directed that these 5 sentences (effectively 3 months) be served cumulatively upon the earlier 3 sentences (effectively 4 months); that is to say, the effective sentence for the 8 offences was 7 months imprisonment.  The Court further directed that the appellant be released after serving 6 weeks imprisonment, on a good behaviour bond for a period of 12 months.

		The grounds of appeal
		The appellant ultimately relied on 6 identical grounds in each appeal, viz:-
		(1)	The learned Magistrate erred in failing to give sufficient weight to the appellant's youth.
		(2)	The learned Magistrate erred in failing to give sufficient weight to the appellant's co-operation with the authorities and his plea of guilty.
		(3)	The learned Magistrate erred in imposing a sentence which in all the circumstances was manifestly excessive.
		(4)	The learned Magistrate erred in that he did not give sufficient consideration to the imposition of a community service work order.
		(5)	The learned Magistrate erred in that he gave undue weight to the prior record of the appellant.
		(6)	The disparity between the sentence of the appellant and the sentences of his co-offenders on 11 March 1994, Brendan Sariago and Roderick Walker, was manifestly excessive and this disparity would, unless corrected, leave the appellant with a justifiable sense of grievance.

Mr Dooley of counsel for the appellant conceded that the learned Magistrate referred to and took into account the appellant's co-operation with the authorities; on this basis he did not press with any vigour ground 2 of the appeal.

		The facts of the 8 offences		
		(a)	The offences of 8 February 1994
		On Tuesday, 8 February 1994, the appellant in company with two others, in the Litchfield Park carpark, used a screwdriver to break the lock of the front passenger door of a white Toyota sedan.  Once the vehicle was opened, he climbed inside and rummaged through the glovebox and rear seat, looking for property.  He was unable to find anything and  alighted the vehicle.
		A short time later, at the same location, using a screwdriver, he broke the lock of the front passenger door of a Ford Station wagon.  Once the vehicle was opened, he climbed inside and rummaged through the glovebox.  He removed a brown leather wallet suede money belt.  The money belt contained $300 cash, $503 US and a quantity of foreign coins and money.  He then alighted from the vehicle, walked over to his own vehicle, and placed the property in the glovebox.  He and his co-offenders then attempted to leave the area in their vehicle but were prevented from doing so by a Park Ranger.
		The Park Ranger requested that the Appellant and his two co-offenders accompany him to the Batchelor Police Station.  The appellant and co-offenders complied with that direction, although the stolen property was discarded (in such a manner that it could later be recovered) before arriving at the Police Station.  The appellant participated in a record of interview making full and frank admissions.  All the property was in fact recovered.

		(b)	The offences of 11 March 1994
		On Friday 11 March 1994 at 11.30 am, the appellant in company with two other people at the Casuarina Beach carpark in Darwin used a screwdriver to break the lock of the passenger door of a Holden utility.  He rummaged through the glovebox.  On finding nothing to steal, he left the vehicle.  The 3 left the general area in their own vehicle and drove to Buffalo Creek carpark.
		Here, again using a screwdriver, the appellant forced the door lock of a Toyota Hilux.  The appellant removed several items of property (which are not relevant to this appeal) from the vehicle.
		The appellant's co-accused in the meantime had gone to a green-coloured Toyota utility and removed a fishing net and a small mini car tyre compressor, all of which were contained in a canvas carry bag.
		On leaving the respective vehicles, inter alia, the appellant returned to his motor vehicle and drove to the Lee Point Beach carpark.
		The appellant again used a screwdriver on the door lock of a Hiace vehicle attempting to gain entry.  He was unable to do so.  Thereupon the appellant and his co-offenders  left the area.
		The appellant and his co-offenders were apprehended by the Police the same day, at about 12.05pm.  The appellant subsequently participated in a record of interview making full and frank admissions.  

		The Court proceedings of 20 May 1994
		The appellant came before the Court of Summary Jurisdiction on 20 May 1994.  The Police prosecutor proceeded with the 8 charges now the subject of these appeals.  After consenting to the Court's jurisdiction, pursuant to s121A of the Justices Act (NT), the appellant pleaded guilty to the 8 offences.
		The prosecutor stated the alleged circumstances in which the offences were committed.  The appellant accepted these facts as correct.  The Court accepted the pleas of guilty and convicted the appellant.
		In mitigation, Mr Kitchener and Mr Stubbs of counsel for the appellant submitted that the Court should impose on the appellant "a non-custodial sentence" or "a fully suspended sentence", given the appellant's youth, that it was his first appearance before an adult Court, his contrition as evidenced by his pleas of guilty and his having assisted Police by making full admissions; and notwithstanding that the appellant had committed the second set of offences on 11 March 1994 whilst on bail for the similar offences committed on 8 February 1994, and that some of the offences are very serious and the frequency of their occurrence a matter of concern.
		 His Worship then turned to consider the prior criminal history of the appellant and his co-offenders.  There was some initial confusion as to the prior criminal history of the co-offender Mr Walker.  This was resolved after an adjournment.  Mr Stubbs then conceded that as a result of the appellant's prior criminal history a "parity argument" could not generally be set up between the appellant and his co-offender, Mr Walker.  
		In the course of Mr Stubbs' submissions in mitigation, two exchanges occurred which are relevant to issues raised on the appeal.  First, his Worship said at transcript p16:-
		"What really does concern me about this young man is that he's broken so many good behaviour bonds - - -.  I'm prepared to be corrected on that.  That's what really worried me - - -.  How do I justify [placing] him [on] another [good behaviour bond]."
		His Worship was never "corrected" on that matter.   In fact, on 6 occasions the appellant had breached various bonds he had entered into. 
		Second, his Worship observed that the appellant had committed the offences of 11 March 1994 whilst on bail for the similar offences of 8 February 1994, and that on that basis it "makes it hard to deal with [the appellant] with any sort of leniency."  I note for example R v Richards (1981) 2 NSWLR 464 at p465, R v Gray [1977] VR 225 at p210 and Trueman v Svikart & Trenerry (unreported, Kearney J, 17 April 1995) at pp25-26, as to the relevance of this factor in sentencing.
		His Worship then proceeded to sentence the appellant as set out at pp2-5.

		The appellant's submissions on the grounds of appeal:
		(1)	The learned Magistrate erred in failing to give sufficient weight to the appellant's youth
		Mr Dooley submitted that the learned Magistrate erred in failing to give sufficient weight to the appellant's youth, notwithstanding his Worship's reference to the appellant as a "young man".  In support, he relied on Mason v Pryce (1988) 34A Crim R 1 and the authorities therein cited.  See also Gollan v Bourne & Thomson (1989) 42 A Crim R 22.

		(2)	The learned Magistrate erred in failing to give sufficient weight to the appellant's co-operation with the authorities and his plea of guilty
		For the reason indicated on p6 this ground of appeal was not pressed with any vigour. 

		(3)	The learned Magistrate erred in imposing a sentence which in all the circumstances was manifestly excessive
		Mr Dooley submitted that the sentences imposed were manifestly excessive in all the circumstances.  In support he sought to rely on 6 sentencing cases as establishing the indicative range of sentencing for persons of the appellant's age-group charged with the offence of interfering with a motor vehicle, irrespective of what their prior criminal record may have been, and making their first or near first appearance before a Court of Summary Jurisdiction.
		He submitted, in essence, that the range thus established did not go beyond a fully-suspended sentence Consequently, he submitted, this case represented a new high water mark in sentencing for this type of offence.

		(4)	That the learned Magistrate erred in that he did not give sufficient consideration to the imposition of a community service order (herein 'CSO')
		Mr Dooley submitted that his Worship had erred in this respect, notwithstanding that the appellant's then counsel had not addressed his Worship on this disposition.
		Mr Dooley submitted, in effect, that his Worship had a positive duty to initiate an inquiry regarding the appropriateness of imposing a CSO, particularly as this was the appellant's first appearance before an adult Court.  In support, he relied on Yunupingu v Bryson (unreported, Supreme Court (NT), 24 August 1994) at p6, where Martin CJ said:-
		"It is primarily a matter for those representing the accused, being in the best position to obtain instructions in relation to the matters to be considered where it is thought that orders of that type may be appropriate, to lay the information before the Court and indicate that the accused would consent to such an order if it was proposed to be made.  Certainly, reports are required from a probation officer in each case, but experience tends to show that such reports are able to be obtained on short notice.  However, a Court might always initiate enquiry regarding the appropriateness of either such orders being made and whether or not the offender would consent." (emphasis mine)

Mr Dooley also relied on Wood v Samuel (1974) 8 SASR 465 at 469.

		(5)	That the learned Magistrate erred in that he gave undue weight to the prior record of the appellant
		Mr Dooley made 2 separate submissions in support of this ground of appeal.  First, he submitted that his Worship gave undue weight to the appellant's prior criminal history, in fact so much weight that he had "allowed that record to - - - overwhelm the other sentencing principles [and factors]", thereby vitiating his exercise of the sentencing discretion.
		Mr Dooley submitted, in essence, that the relevance of the prior criminal history was limited to militating against leniency in the circumstances of a given case.  In support, he relied on R v Baumer (1988) 35 A Crim R 340, Veen (No.2) v The Queen (1987-1988) 164 CLR 465 and R v Jabaltjari (1989) 64 NTR 1 at pp16 and 33-35.  Mr Dooley made various submissions in relation to R v Mulholland (1991) 1 NTLR 1.  The nub of those submissions appears at transcript pp58-59, viz:-
		"MR DOOLEY:  - - - Your Honour in [the] decision [of] Mulholland Angel J opens up the question of what are the relevant factors pertaining to the offences. 

		- - - 

		[His Honour at p13 of that judgment] talks of the increased culpability for the instant offence - - - in the light of previous criminal offending.  In my submission, in determining the relevant facts pertaining to the offence and trying to perhaps ascertain an objective sentence, [his Honour has] introduced, as a part of those relevant facts, the mental elements that were involved in earlier offending, which, in my submission, is something that is not so clearly perhaps referred to by any other judges in any other cases that I've been able to seek out in the last couple of days.

		Your Honour, - - - Angel J goes on to discuss these matters further on page 14 and he refers to Sultan v Svikart [(1989) 96 FLR 457] and indicates that he thinks the argument misconceives what the High Court [said] in Baumer where it referred to the circumstances of the offence.  There seems to be a different focus on that particular comment, and if it's accepted - if Angel Js assessment of the circumstances of the offence in Baumer is, as he puts it, involving prior criminality, in my submission that is something which breaks away from other assessments of the Baumer judgment, which, in my submission, leads to difficulties in this area."

		Second, Mr Dooley submitted that his Worship erred in taking into account certain "'without conviction' [dispositions] imposed in the Juvenile Court",  which were set out in the record of the appellant's prior criminal history and tendered by counsel to his Worship during the proceeding.   Mr Dooley argued that notwithstanding that his Worship had said that he would ignore those matters, by having regard to the prior criminal history and saying he would ignore them, his Worship had expressly had regard to them contrary to s90 of the Juvenile Justice Act (NT).
		In support, Mr Dooley relied on Daniels v Svikart (unreported, Martin J (as he then was), 25 May 1989) at p5.

		(6)	That the disparity between the sentence of the appellant and the sentences of his co-offenders, Brendan Sariago and Roderick Walker, was manifestly excessive and this disparity would, unless corrected, leave the appellant with a justifiable sense of grievance 
		Mr Dooley from the outset restricted this ground of appeal to the offences committed on 11 March 1994.
		Mr Dooley submitted that the 'parity' principle applied regardless of the sequence of sentences of the appellant and his co-offenders.  In support he relied on Taylor v Svikart (unreported, Martin CJ, 18 May 1994) at p13. I note that Mr Glasgow rightly conceded that this was clear law. 
		Mr Sariago, a 21 year old man, was sentenced after the appellant on 15 August 1994.  He pleaded guilty to two offences arising from the incidents on 11 March 1994, interfering or tampering with a motor vehicle and stealing.
The following respective penalties were imposed upon him: fined $100 with a victim assistance levy of $20, in default 3 days imprisonment, for the former offence; and fined $200 with a victim assistance levy of $20, in default 5 days imprisonment, for the later offence.  Mr Dooley submitted, and Mr Glasgow conceded, that the stealing offence related to the same property as described in offence 2(b) at p4, the appellant had been convicted of that offence on 20 May 1994, and had been sentenced to 2 months imprisonment for it.
		Mr Walker, a 22 year old man, was sentenced on 18 May 1994, prior to the appellant.  He was charged with 5 offences from the 11 March 1994 incidents: 2 of criminal damage, 2 of interfering or tampering with a motor vehicle, and 1 of unlawful possession.  He was convicted of those offences and dealt with by way of fine in relation to three of the counts - unlawful possession, criminal damage and interfering or tampering with a motor vehicle.  He was convicted and without sentence passed placed on a good behaviour bond for 12 months in relation to each of the remaining 2 offences.
		Mr Dooley submitted that notwithstanding that the appellant was "the principal" in the 8 February and 11 March 1994 offences, and that both co-accused played "a supportive capacity" in committing the offences - 
		"The difference in sentences that [the appellant] received compared to Walker and Sariago is so great that, even taking into [account the above] consideration, - - - there has [clearly] been an error made [in exercising the sentencing discretion]."

		He conceded that as the appellant's prior criminal history was "significantly worse - - -  than [Mr Walker's] - - - his Worship [was entitled to] deal with - - - [the appellant] more severely."  However, the degree of discrepancy between the sentence imposed on the appellant and his co-offenders was so great that that difference in itself pointed to an error, and engendered a "justifiable sense of grievance" in the appellant.
		In support Mr Dooley relied on Lowe v The Queen (1984) 154 CLR 606 at 613 and VT v Winzar (1992) 106 FLR 306.

		The respondent's submissions on the grounds of appeal:	
		Preliminary matters
		Mr Glasgow submitted that this Court should not interfere with his Worship's sentence unless it is satisfied that he had fallen into error and improperly exercised his sentencing discretion.  In support, Mr Glasgow relied on Mason v Pryce (1988) 34 A Crim R 1 at p7.  See also Salmon v Chute (1994) 94 NTR 1 at p24. 
		Mr Glasgow submitted that the appellant had failed to establish that his Worship has fallen into error on any one of the 6 grounds of appeal.

		(1)	The learned Magistrate erred in failing to give sufficient weight to the appellant's youth
		Mr Glasgow submitted that the learned Magistrate gave sufficient weight to the appellant's youth and to the fact that the offences of 8 February and 11 March 1994 involved the appellant's "first adult appearance" before a Court of Summary Jurisdiction.  In support, he relied on the following matters:-
		(i)	Mr Kitchener's submission that the appellant "is now 17 years of age - - - [and that] this is his first appearance before the adult Courts."
		(ii)	The following exchange at transcript 20 May, p15:-
			"MR STUBBS:  We still draw comfort from the
			fact that its [the appellant's] first adult appearance.

			HIS WORSHIP:  I agree.  Detention is a 
			much different thing from gaol."

		(iii)	His Worship's observation at transcript p15 that the appellant is "much younger" than Mr Walker.

		(2)	The learned Magistrate erred in failing to give sufficient weight to the appellant's co-operation with the authorities and his plea of guilty
		Mr Glasgow submitted that his Worship took into account, and gave sufficient weight to, the appellant's co-operation with the authorities and his pleas of guilty.  
		In support, Mr Glasgow relied on the appellant's concession in regard to this ground of appeal; and to transcript p18 where his Worship specifically referred to and took into account the appellant's co-operation, and the degree of that co-operation on 8 February 1994, with the Police and the Ranger. 

		(3)	The learned Magistrate erred in imposing a sentence which in all the circumstances was manifestly excessive
		Mr Glasgow submitted that the sentence imposed by the learned Magistrate was not manifestly excessive in all the circumstances, especially that of the appellant's prior criminal history which related to similar offences and showed a "propensity for breaching bonds."
		Mr Glasgow submitted that the 6 cases relied on by Mr Dooley to support the appellant's third ground of appeal, if they represented "a typical - - - spread of these type of offences in relation to young offenders with juvenile records", showed two things: (1) that the Court of Summary Jurisdiction shows a degree of leniency for these offences; and (2) that Magistrates are "most reluctant to give - - - a young adult offender, his first taste of prison.  This illustrates a lenient and 'last chance' approach to sentencing."
		He submitted that this Court must also bear in mind the principle set out in Mason v Pryce (supra) at pp7 and 9: it should not substitute its own judgment unless it is satisfied that the learned Magistrate had erred, and it should be reluctant to interfere with the appellant's sentences in that - 
		"There is a very real danger that repeated exercises in leniency bring the law into contempt, not only in the eyes of the offender, but in the eyes of the community."
Mr Glasgow apparently conceded that the 6 cases showed that -
		"for practical purposes there is a range of sentencing in the Magistrate's Court in relation to offences committed by young offenders of this type which does not [extend] to sentences of immediate imprisonment".

He re-iterated that the 6 cases relied on by the appellant to establish that range involved lenient sentencing, and that the appellant had to establish that his sentence was manifestly excessive to succeed on the appeal.  See Mason v Pryce (supra) at p7; see also R v Raggett, Douglas & Miller (supra) at p47.
		On its face the concession mentioned, if read in isolation, appears fatal to the respondent's case.  However, properly understood in its context, it is no more than a concession that the 6 cases relied on by the appellant are lenient sentences, decided on the particular circumstances of those cases.

		(4)	That the learned Magistrate erred in that he did not give sufficient consideration to the imposition of a community service order
		Mr Glasgow submitted, in essence, that the Court is not obliged to list expressly all the possible dispositions available or appropriate in a given set of circumstances.  He submitted that Yunupingu v Bryson (supra) at p6 did not support the appellant's submission to that effect.
		In the circumstances of this case, he submitted that his Worship quite correctly observed, when having regard to the appellant's prior criminal history, that the appellant was "not a person who seemed to respond to that type of [order], because he had frequently - - - failed on every occasion to [comply with] bonds [he had been placed on] in the past."  Accordingly, the Court had implicitly had regard to the imposition of a CSO, but had considered it inappropriate in the circumstances.

		(5)	That the learned Magistrate erred in that he gave undue weight to the prior record of the appellant
		Mr Glasgow submitted that the learned Magistrate had not given undue weight to the prior criminal history of the appellant, although he conceded that it certainly "loomed large - - - in his [Worship's] mind."
		He submitted that the relevance of the prior criminal history is limited to militating against leniency; in support he relied on R v Baumer (supra) at p345.  On this basis, he submitted that either on a fair reading of the transcript or on having regard to the sentence itself, the appellant's submission that his Worship took his record into account to increase the sentence so as in effect to punish the appellant twice for his past criminality, cannot be sustained.

		(6)	That the disparity between the sentence of the appellant and the sentences of his co-offenders, Brendan Sariago and Roderick Walker, was manifestly excessive and this disparity would, unless corrected, leave the appellant with a justifiable sense of grievance
		Mr Glasgow at first conceded that "there is a parity argument which was put up by [Mr Dooley] - - - which has some legs."  However, he later submitted that his Worship was justified in sentencing the appellant differently to Mr Walker and Mr Sariago.  
		He submitted that in relation to Mr Walker, the following 3 factors supported this submission:-
		(i)	The appellant's prior criminal history is significantly different from Mr Walker's.  Mr Walker was "a more typical youthful first offender". 
		(ii)	The appellant, unlike Mr Walker, had breached a number of bonds.
		(iii)	The appellant, unlike Mr Walker, committed the 11 March 1994 offences whilst on bail for the 8 February offences.

		In relation to Mr Sariago, Mr Glasgow submitted that the disparity in sentencing was justified because the appellant's prior criminal history was significantly different from that of Mr Sariago.

		In support, Mr Glasgow relied on Daniels v Svikart (supra) and Lowe v The Queen (supra). Mr Glasgow also sought to rely on Mr Stubbs' general concession before his Worship, that in respect of Mr Walker a parity argument could not be set up.

		The appellant in reply
		Mr Dooley reiterated his submission that, as to ground 6, the disparity in sentencing between the appellant and his co-offenders was so significant that in itself it constituted error. 

		Conclusions on the appeal
		The general principles applicable to appeals against sentence are set out in Salmon v Chute (supra) at p24, and in the authorities there cited.  The appellant must show that the exercise of the sentencing discretion has miscarried.  All 6 grounds of appeal turned on a close construction of the Court's sentencing remarks, and of exchanges between the Court and defence counsel.  As to this approach I bear in mind the cautionary observations by Muirhead J in R v Davey (1980) 50 FLR 57 at 66 which apply here, mutatis mutandis:-
		"A Judge's remarks on sentence will seldom reveal all the matters he takes into consideration - - - remarks on sentence should not be reviewed on appeal as though they are a reserved judgment.  They are frequently made ex tempore and in conversational manner, but generally only after anxious thought."  (emphasis mine)

In my opinion, on a fair reading of the Court's sentencing remarks, and bearing in mind the parties' submissions, the appeal should be dismissed in part, for the following reasons.

		Grounds 1 and 2 of the appeal
		As to grounds 1 and 2 of the appeal, I consider that the Court gave consideration and appropriate weight to the relevant factors of the appellant's youth, the fact that it was his first appearance before an adult court, his degree of co-operation with the authorities, and his plea of guilty.

		Ground 3 of the appeal
		As to ground 3 of the appeal, notwithstanding Mr Glasgow's apparent concession that the 6 cases relied on by the appellant establish a "fair" and "adequate" range, I do not consider that that sample of 6 cases put forward establishes a range of sentencing.  See R v Ireland (1987) 29 A Crim R 353 at pp361-362.
		In any event, the information as to those cases is deficient in that 4 of them do not set out the types of prior offences the respective defendants committed.  I consider that the appellant has failed to provide this Court with sufficient relevant statistical information to support this ground of appeal: see Liddy v Winzar (unreported, Kearney J, 8 June 1995) at pp28-29, and Marshall v Llewellyn (unreported, Kearney J, 3 May 1995) at p16, and the authorities there cited.
		The question is whether the sentences imposed are not just arguably excessive but so obviously excessive that they are unreasonable or plainly unjust; see Salmon v Chute (supra) at pp24-25.  
		 In light of the objective circumstances of the offences and the subjective circumstances of the offender, I consider that the effective sentence imposed is not manifestly excessive.  See generally R v Raggett, Douglas & Miller (1990) 50 A Crim R 41 at 47.  Consequently, ground 3 of the appeal must fail.  

		Ground 4 of the appeal
		As to ground 4, I reject Mr Dooley's submission that his Worship was under a positive duty to inquire whether a CSO was appropriate in this case.  I accept Mr Glasgow's submission that Yunupingu v Bryson (supra) at p6 does not support the appellant's submission.  As I said in Wanambi v Thompson (unreported, 12 December 1994) at p37:-
		"It is not the duty of a sentencing Court to set out in detail, or in general terms, each and every disposition available in a given case, and then to explain why and on what basis that disposition is or is not made.  It is presumed that a Court in exercising its sentencing discretion will keep the alternative dispositions in mind in assessing what is the appropriate disposition for the case and offender under consideration, - - - ."

In this case his Worship had the assistance of Mr Kitchener and Mr Stubbs of counsel who made various submissions to the effect that the appropriate dispositions were either a fine, a non-custodial sentence or a fully-suspended sentence.   His Worship, after referring to the appellant's prior criminal history, in particular the previous number of bonds which he had breached and the fact that he had committed the offences of 11 March 1994 whilst on bail for the similar offences of 8 February, considered that a CSO would be inappropriate. 
		In my opinion ground of appeal 4 must fail. 

		Ground 5 of the appeal
		As to ground 5 of the appeal, as to the appellant's first submission, I accept Mr Glasgow's concession that the appellant's prior criminal history loomed large in the Magistrate's mind in exercising his sentencing discretion, particularly in light of the two factors noted at p10.
		His Worship clearly treated the record as relevant to leniency.
		In my opinion, a fair reading of the transcript indicates that his Worship recognised that the appellant's criminal history was relevant and could be taken into account as indicated in Veen (No.2) v The Queen (supra), but gave it no greater weight than that it militated against leniency.  See generally The Queen v Spicer & Ors (unreported, CCA, 7 April 1994) at pp32-35, per Priestley J.  See also R v Richards (supra) at p465, R v Gray (supra) at p230 and Trueman v Svikart & Trenerry (supra) at pp26-27.
		For the purposes of this appeal that conclusion resolves the first limb of ground 5 of the appeal; it is unnecessary to go on to consider the effect of R v Mulholland (supra) at pp13-14.
		As to the second submission, I do not accept Mr Dooley's submission at p17.  Clearly, the learned and very experienced Magistrate is well acquainted with s90 of the Juvenile Justices Act; see his remark at p9 of the transcript of 20 May 1994:-
		"The first [offence on the prior criminal history] we [can] ignore because it's 'without conviction'".

Notwithstanding that the 'without conviction' dispositions were listed in the prior criminal history before his Worship, the above remark clearly shows that his Worship had ignored those dispositions when exercising his sentencing discretion.
		For the above reasons the second limb of ground 5 of the appeal must fail.  

		Ground 6 of the appeal
		As to ground 6 of the appeal, I accept Mr Glasgow's submissions at p21, subject to one exception, that the factors there set out justify the appellant receiving a disparate sentence.  Lowe v The Queen (supra) supports this conclusion. I should say that to the list of factors relevant to the comparison with both co-offenders I would include the appellant's higher degree of culpability as a "principal", in committing both sets of offences, apart from that in 2(6). 
		Mr Dooley sought to rely on VT v Winzar (supra) to establish this ground of appeal.  In my opinion the facts of that case are clearly distinguishable; see VT v Winzar (supra) at pp311-312.  In that case the differences between the appellant and his co-offender's criminality in committing the offences, and in their respective prior criminal histories, were "only superficial".  Mildren J said that on that basis a disparate sentence could not be justified; the appellant there had received a total of 6 months detention whereas his co-offender received only one month detention for the same offence.  In contrast the factors set out at p21 and above show a substantial difference between the appellant and his co-offenders which, in my opinion, justifies a disparate sentence.
		The "one exception" referred to on p26 relates to the submission made by Mr Dooley and the concession by Mr Glasgow in respect of offence 2(b) at p4.  Clearly, the sentence imposed on the appellant in relation to that offence, when compared to the co-offender's degree of criminality in relation thereto and to the sentence imposed on Mr Walker lead to the conclusion that the sentence imposed on the appellant in respect of this offence is unjustifiably disparate from that imposed on his co-offender.  Consequently, ground 6 of the appeal must succeed to that extent.
		Pursuant to s177 of the Justices Act I would allow the appeal in part, quashing the sentence in relation to offence 2(b) at p4, and in lieu thereof substituting a fine of $100 with a victim assistance levy of $20, in default 3 days imprisonment.  Otherwise, I would affirm the individual sentences in relation to offences 1(a)(i,)(ii) and (b), and 2(a)(i)-(iv) (see pp2-4).
		I would also affirm his Worship's directions at pp3 and 5 as to the service of those individual sentences and the final disposition at p5.
		Orders accordingly.
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