Raymond v Binjari Community Government Council & Anor
[1999] NTSC 132

PARTIES:	RAYMOND, Barbara 

	v

	BINJARI COMMUNITY GOVERNMENT COUNCIL

	AND

	HAGGER, Mark Edward

TITLE OF COURT:	SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY

JURISDICTION:	THE ELECTION TRIBUNAL OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY

FILE NO:	1/99

DELIVERED:	2 DECEMBER 1999

HEARING DATES:	17 NOVEMBER 1999

JUDGMENT OF:	MARTIN CJ

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:
	Petitioner:	G Cole
	Respondent:	M Carter

Solicitors:
	Petitioner:	G Cole
	Respondent:	Michael Whelan & Assoc

Judgment category classification:	C
Judgment ID Number:	mar99039
Number of pages:	4

Mar99039

IN THE ELECTION TRIBUNAL
OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
OF AUSTRALIA
AT DARWIN

Raymond v Binjari Community Government Council & Anor
[1999] NTSC 132
No. 1 of 1999

	BETWEEN:

	BARBARA RAYMOND 
Petitioner

	AND:

	BINJARI COMMUNITY GOVERNMENT COUNCIL
	First Respondent

	AND:

	MARK EDWARD HAGGER
		Second Respondent

CORAM:	MARTIN CJ

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(Delivered 2 December 1999)

[1]	The petitioner’s petition by which she sought declarations as to the validity of election of members to the council of the first respondent was dismissed for reasons delivered on 1 October 1999.  At that time the parties were invited to make submissions as to costs given that this appeared to have been the first time a petition had come before the Tribunal.  In fact there had been an earlier petition, but the question of costs was resolved without consideration of the position between the parties.
[2]	The Tribunal has power to award costs (Northern Territory Electoral Act, 1995 (NT), s 112(b)) and it is provided in s 122 that it may award such costs as it thinks fit in such proceedings.  The security deposit of $500 paid to the Master by the Petitioner is to be dealt with as part of the adjudication upon costs (s 122(2) and s 108(5)).  The Act provides that costs ordered to be paid may be recovered as if the order of the Tribunal were a judgment of the Supreme Court and that order shall be entered as a judgment of the Supreme Court and shall be enforced accordingly (s 122(3)).  No order of the Tribunal is necessary in that regard.
[3]	I note the constitutional importance of the electoral process which is open to be challenged before the Tribunal.  The Tribunal is constituted by Judges of the Supreme Court and the rule making power rests in those Judges (s 129), although none have thus far been made.  The procedures adopted in this case were not unlike those taken in the Supreme Court proceedings upon an Originating Motion.  Issues were joined (although somewhat altered in the course of the hearing) through the petition and reply, coercive process was utilised to effect the production of documents by the first respondent (although it made them willingly available), evidence was taken by affidavit and some deponents were cross-examined at a hearing.  
[4]	No reason has been advanced by any party as to why the principles relating to the award costs by the Courts ought not to apply to proceedings in the Tribunal.  The indicia all point to the adoption of the Supreme Court Rules 0 63 in so far as they can be applied to proceedings before the Tribunal.  Differences between the issues which may arise upon petitions to the Tribunal are capable of being dealt with within the Taxing Master’s discretion.  
[5]	If it were not for one issue, there would be no reason to depart from the usual rule that costs follow the event, and to order the petitioner to pay the respondents costs.  Counsel for the respondents seeks such an order.
[6]	The issue concerns the respondents’ questioning whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to entertain the petition.  A ruling was made against them.  The respondents’ three page written submissions canvassed the structure of the legislation and the evidence required to bring the circumstances within the jurisdiction of a Tribunal and the petitioner’s reply ran to some eight pages.  When the issue was argued on 7 September, the respondents’ position was that it had a good case on the merits, but considered that the Tribunal should satisfy itself that it had jurisdiction.  There was little by way of oral submission.  
[7]	The evidence relied upon by the petitioner to establish jurisdiction would have been required to satisfy the Tribunal on this issue in any event.  It was obliged to satisfy the requirements of the Act that, in respect of an election such as this, assistance had been rendered in respect of the election by the Chief Electoral Officer under s 6.  It would also have been necessary for the petitioner to put submissions to the Tribunal applying the evidence to the statute.  The petitioner was, however, put to some additional cost in having to consider the respondents submissions and prepare to deal with the matter at a sitting of the Tribunal called to consider that matter.  She should obtain a fair allowance for the cost to which she was put in meeting the objection beyond that which she would have borne in establishing her case in that regard.  The respondents should not recover any costs in relation to that aspect of the case.
[8]	It is ordered that:
1.	the petitioner pay to the respondents 90% of the respondents’ costs to be taxed in accordance with the Supreme Court Rules; 
2.	the security paid to the Master is to be applied towards the costs of the respondents in accordance with the Act.