PARTIES:	NELSON, John Jabarula v
CHUTE, John Henry

TITLE OF COURT:	SUPREME COURT OF THE NT

JURISDICTION:	JUSTICES APPEALS

FILE NO:	11 of 1994

DELIVERED:	12 May 1994

HEARING DATE:	28 April 1994

JUDGMENT OF:	MARTIN CJ.

CATCHWORDS:

Criminal Law - Jurisdiction, practice and procedure - Judgment and punishment - Sentence - Juveniles - Purpose of sentencing - Relevant principles - Deterrence - Rehabilitation - Protection of the community - Preventative detention

Criminal Law - Jurisdiction, practice and procedure - Judgment and punishment - Sentence - Juvenile offenders - Relevant principles - Rehabilitation - Irrelevant factors
- Detention of juveniles for rehabilitative purposes

Criminal Law - Jurisdiction, practice and procedure - Judgment and punishment - Sentence - Juvenile offenders - Relevant principles - Rehabilitation - Relevant considerations - Alternatives to detention

Juvenile Justices Act (NT), s53.

Criminal Law - Jurisdiction, practice and procedure - Judgment and punishment - Sentence - Juvenile offenders - Relevant principles - Rehabilitation - Relevant considerations - Pre-sentence reports

Juvenile Justices Act (NT) ss42, 52

Criminal Law - Jurisdiction, practice and procedure - Judgment and punishment - Sentence - Northern Territory - Juvenile offenders - Aboriginal offenders - Purpose and nature of legislation - detention as a last resort

Community Welfare Act (NT) ss4(2), 68, 69 and 70 - Juvenile Justices Act (NT)

R v Homer (1976) 13 SASR 377 at 382 - 83, applied.

M v Waldron (1988) 56 NTR 1 at 6 - 7, referred to.

Yovanovic v Pryce (1985) 33 NTR 24, applied. Peckham v Hill No 208/1992, unreported 9.10.92, Mildren J., referred to.

Criminal Law - Jurisdiction, practice and procedure - Judgment and punishment - Sentence - Northern Territory - Juvenile offenders - Aboriginal offenders - Factors to be taken into account - Circumstances of particular offender
Circumstances differing between Aboriginal communities

Criminal Law - Appeal - Appeal against sentence - Grounds
for interference - General principles - Objections and point not raised in Court below - Finality principle - Circumstances setting aside principle - Juvenile offenders
Sentence fails objectives of sentencing juveniles

Criminal Law - Appeal - Appeal against sentence - Grounds for interference - Pre-sentence report not ordered

W (1990) 48 A Crim R 72, referred to.
Manning v Police (1993) 65 A Crim R 382, applied.
Hardie (1979) 4 A Crim R 343, applied.
Hrvojevic (unreported, Court of Crim Appeal, Tas 6.6.79), applied.

Criminal Law - Jurisdiction, practice and procedure - Judgment and punishment - Sentence - Juvenile offenders - Pre-sentence reports - Ordering report
Juvenile Justice Act ss38 - 39, s44 and s58 Criminal Law - Appeal - Sentence - Grounds for
interference - Abuse of principles of natural justice - fair
hearing

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:

Appellant:	Ms T Burrows Respondent:	Ms K Channells
Solicitors: Appellant:	NAALAS
Respondent:	DPP

DISTRIBUTION:	LOCAL

2

mar94004

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY OF AUSTRALIA

No. JA 11 of 1994

BETWEEN:

JOHN JABARULA NELSON
Appellant

AND:

JOHN HENRY CHUTE
Respondent

CORAM:	MARTIN CJ.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(Delivered 12 May 1994)

On 11 February this year the appellant was convicted before the Juvenile Court, sitting at Darwin, for that on
30 November 1993 he did unlawfully use a motor vehicle and that the unlawful use involved the circumstance of aggravation that it was to the value of $20,000 or more, namely $36,000 (s118(2)(b) Criminal Code).	For that he was convicted and sentenced to seven months detention, that period to commence as from 11 December 1993, upon which date he had been sentenced for a prior offence, by the Juvenile Court sitting at Alice Springs to four months detention. The effective result of the sentence imposed in respect of the motor vehicle charge was that the appellant must serve an additional three months upon expiry

of the period of four months in respect of the other matter. In addition to the sentence of detention, it was ordered that he be disqualified "from driving or obtaining or holding a driver's licence for a period of three years".	That latter order was to run from 11 February 1994.	From that sentence and order the appellant appeals upon the grounds that the sentence was manifestly excessive and more particular grounds as follows:

that the learned Magistrate erred in finding that detention was the sole means of satisfying the sentencing principle of rehabilitation;

that the leaned Magistrate erred in failing to place sufficient weight on the appellant's attempts to harm himself whilst in detention;

that the learned Magistrate erred in failing to request a report from the Minister, regarding the appellant;

that the learned Magistrate erred in failing to request counsel to make submissions regarding the imposition of the specific additional penalty of disqualifying the appellant from holding a licence to drive a motor vehicle.

In brief, the facts alleged and admitted by counsel on behalf of the appellant upon the hearing in the Juvenile Court, were that on the day in question he saw the motor vehicle

parked in the driveway of a property in a street in Alice Springs, and watched as the driver left the motor vehicle leaving the keys in the ignition and the motor running.	The driver then entered the house, the appellant went to the vehicle, sat in the driver's seat, selected reverse gear and drove out onto the street where a co-offender was waiting.	The co-offender then sat in the driver's seat and the appellant became the passenger.	The co-offender drove the vehicle to Undoolya, and then returned to the town area where the appellant resumed driving the vehicle in a northerly direction along the Stuart Highway with a view to going to Yuendumu where he then normally resided.	He and the co-offender were apprehended, after a police chase and rollover.	When interviewed the appellant admitted to his complicity in the taking and driving of the vehicle.

The appellant was said to have been fifteen years of age when dealt with by the Court, but his precise birthday is not known.	The Court was told that he is an aboriginal who normally resided at Yuendumu, but at the time of the offence had been in Alice Springs for some time and had unsuccessfully endeavoured to return to Yuendumu by legitimate means.	He took the car to return there.	As to his personal circumstances, counsel before the Juvenile Court informed it that the appellant resided at Yuendumu with his mother and an uncle who was also involved in his upbringing, but that at the time of the hearing he was at the Wildman River Juvenile Detention Centre near Darwin, and that if he developed some skills there

he would try to get work with the Yuendumu council when he returned to his home.	Some information had been sought from those in charge of the detention centre by counsel for the appellant who informed his Worship that he had had difficulty coping in a social context whilst in the centre, that there had been two attempts by him to harm himself while he was there, and that the staff were trying to help him with his problems, including his difficulty in coping with his peers.	According to the information available to his counsel, the appellant enjoyed working under the regime at Wildman River.

Beyond that, the Court knew nothing of the appellant except his reasonably extensive record of criminal convictions. It commenced in October 1991 (at age about 13) with a series of offences, principally for stealing and unlawful entry for which he was convicted and ordered to perform a substantial number of hours of community service; 11 June 1992, further like offences for which he was placed under supervision for 18 months; four months later, he was ordered to perform community service in relation to firearms offences; 28 April 1993, further convictions for unlawful entry and stealing with a further order for community service, and on the same date a series of what must have been relatively minor matters for which he was convicted without penalty; 23 June 1993 stealing and unlawful entry for which, according to the record, he was convicted to a total of three months imprisonment and a further 30 days imprisonment for breach of his bond (for "imprisonment" I take it that detention was meant).	All those convictions

were dealt with in the Juvenile Court at Yuendumu and it might therefore be reasonably safely deduced that the offences were committed in and around that community in central Australia which is largely populated by Aboriginal people.	He was then dealt with in the Alice Springs Juvenile Court on 23 December 1993 for deprivation of liberty and aggravated assault (being assault by male upon a female and involving a weapon) for which he was sentenced to the four months detention earlier referred to.	It was for that matter that he was serving the sentence when he came before the Juvenile Court in relation to the unlawful use of the motor vehicle.	It will be noted that that was the first occasion upon which he had been dealt with for such an offence.	Although the matter might normally have been dealt with in Alice Springs, the Magistrate, before whom it was due to come on, disqualified himself because he knew the owner of the car.	It was transferred to Darwin, being near the place where the appellant was confined.

In sentencing the appellant, his Worship commenced by referring to his history of criminal offending, particularly for dishonesty offences; referred to the then matters as involving dishonesty; noted the seriousness of the offence and went on to note that it was admitted (as it had been) that the vehicle was involved in an accident while being driven by the appellant, and written off, its value being $36,000, which is: "a very severe consequence of your actions on this occasion. You are a person of no means.	You equally have no ability to pay that sort of money back to the person and I'm sure you didn't

care when you took it anyway".	His Worship proceeded to talk about the prevalence of that type of offending, and of the need for general deterrence, but reminded himself that he must bear in mind his principle concerns under the Juvenile Justice Act, namely, the appellant's rehabilitation, and that matters such as punishment were to take a back seat.	His Worship then posed for himself the following question: "What would be appropriate in the hope that you would be rehabilitated?".	He noted the appellant's age, and expressed the hope that he was not beyond hope whilst noting the prior history of offending, and concluded his remarks by saying:

"The period of time that you are spending at Wildman River I consider might be rehabilitation for you and I consider that at your current stage of your development and your history of offending, that continued time at Wildman River would be in your best interests for your rehabilitation in order to break the cycle of offending which you have apparently engaged in."

He then proceeded to impose the sentence and make the
order.

The maximum sentence for the offence for which the appellant was convicted is seven years imprisonment, but the Juvenile Court may only order that a juvenile be detained at a detention centre for a period not exceeding the period that may be imposed under the relevant law in relation to the offence or 12 months, whichever is the lesser (s53(1)(g)). That does not mean that the maximum penalty that may be imposed for the

offence is reduced from seven years to one year if the offender is a juvenile, but rather that the limit of the jurisdiction of a Juvenile Court is to impose a sentence of 12 months.	The Supreme Court is not so inhibited (s39(1)(b)).	The appellant was thus sentenced to a period of seven months detention in relation to a maximum penalty of seven years, not 12 months. The position is the same as that in relation to the jurisdictional limit on sentence for imprisonment applying in the Court of Summary Jurisdiction, Sultan v Svikart (1989) 96 FLR 457.

Counsel for the appellant placed before this Court details of sentences imposed on juveniles, who had prior convictions for dishonesty, including unlawful use of motor vehicles, upon conviction for unlawful use of motor vehicles. Counsel for the respondent did not produce any information which might be a guide as to what might be the pattern for offences such as this in relation to offenders such as the appellant.	It is plain that a sentence of seven months detention is way beyond that imposed upon like offenders (with like records), in the Juvenile Court, for like offences.	The maximum detention was for a period of three months, in other cases detention orders were suspended forthwith upon the offender entering into a bond to be of good behaviour with conditions (including being subjected to supervision), and others tailored for the particular case.	In what was regarded, in the view of counsel for the appellant, as being the worst case, dealt with in this Court, a juvenile on bond for

committing arson, unlawfully used a very expensive motor vehicle and damaged it, he had priors for dishonesty, though none for the unlawful use of a motor vehicle.	He was sentenced to six months detention, suspended upon his entering into a bond to be of good behaviour for one year with supervision.	The pattern which emerges, admittedly on fairly limited information, but, consistent with general policy involving the sentencing of juveniles, is that such persons are not placed in confinement, but rather, given the opportunity to serve the sentence within their communities with supervision (by whom is not explicit), and under such conditions as the sentencing Court thinks appropriate in the particular case. The learned Magistrate dealt with sentence briefly, noted that the appellant was receiving training and acquiring skills that might well assist his rehabilitation when released into the community, and considered that it would be in his best interests if that situation was continued for a time.	That view was taken by his Worship upon the very limited information made available to him, and without any express regard being paid to the many alternatives for disposition provided for in s53 of the Act. No submissions were made that would assist his Worship in considering such matters.	Indeed, counsel for the appellant said in address to his Worship that it was most probable that he would impose some further detention, but did not suggest suspension of it in whole or in part.

It should have been noticed by the Juvenile Court that in June 1992 the appellant entered into a good behaviour

bond for a period of 18 months and was ordered to be subject to supervision (at least that is what I make of the short particulars provided). He offended soon afterwards and on a total of five occasions came before the same Court without any steps being taken in relation to the breach of his undertaking. No enquiry was made as to the adequacy of the supervision then available so as to assess why it failed, nor was any information initially available to this Court as to the supervision which could be extended to the appellant in the community now, and why it might be more likely to succeed, if that was the case. No information was available as to the support and discipline which the appellant might receive from his family or others responsible for his growing up.	With what degree of understanding a thirteen year old aboriginal from Yuendumu would have entered into a bond to be of good behaviour is entirely conjectural.

The Preamble to the Act shows that its objective, amongst other things, is that juveniles be dealt with in the criminal law system in a manner consistent with their age and level of maturity. The ultimate aim of any criminal justice system is the protection of the community but it must always be remembered that an inappropriate disposition of a juvenile may well lead to that person becoming more of a threat to the community than achieving that objective.	It would be easy enough, but wrong (though I do not find that his Worship did so) to simply look at a record of conviction such as the appellant has and come to an extremely adverse view of him, such

as to lead to the conclusion that there was only one thing to do, order him to be kept in custody.	It would also be inappropriate to simply consider that an offender would be better off institutionalised because he or she may there obtain the benefits of training and the acquisition of skills which will be of assistance once that person returns to the community. That is to deny the opportunity for those things to happen in the community itself within the resources available to it.	I fail to appreciate why it is that sending a fifteen year old aboriginal over 1,500 kilometres from his home to be detained in an institution in a place where there is no family, or extended family, support is more likely to lead to his rehabilitation than permitting him to reside at his home community under the control and supervision which is appropriate to that place and his circumstances.	Surely we have not reached the stage of sending children to prison (for that is what it amounts to) to be educated.	If that is the case, there is a need for a drastic reordering of resources.	People are placed in confinement for punishment but where, in enlightened communities, it may be expected that efforts will be made to assist the offender to be a better citizen.	The Courts do not decide that a person is in need of education and then place him or her in confinement for that purpose.

There are some provisions in the Community Welfare Act concerning the welfare of aboriginal children.	For instance, s68 provides that the Minister shall provide such support and assistance to aboriginal communities and

organisations as he thinks fit in order to develop their efforts in respect of the welfare of aboriginal families and children, including the promotion of the training and employment of aboriginal welfare workers.	Whether the community at Yuendumu has endeavoured to take advantage of this provision I do not know, nor as to whether a community government council or an association incorporated under the Associations Incorporation Act has entered into any agreement with the Minister to undertake functions under the Community Welfare Act in relation to the welfare of children, the provision of facilities and training of staff (s70).	It is	noteworthy that that Act makes particular provision in respect of an aboriginal child in need of care by which it endeavours to take into account aboriginal customary arrangements in respect of the care and custody of aboriginal children (s69).	Whether or not the appellant in this case was or is a child in need of care within the meaning of the Act (s4(2)) I do not know.		I must say that efforts made in relation to the welfare of children within the general ambit of the powers given in Part IX of the Community Welfare Act, dealing with Aboriginal Child Welfare, is more likely to be of benefit to the child in the community than endeavouring to deal with the child and the problems encountered by him or her in the criminal justice system under the Juvenile Justice Act. Under the latter provisions, what the Court is trying to do is find the best means of turning the delinquent juvenile into a responsible law abiding adult (R v Homer (1976) 13 SASR 377 at 382 - 383 cited with approval by Kearney J. in M v Waldron (1988) 56 NTR 1 at 6 - 7), but the appropriate course to achieve that

end is not likely to be correctly chosen unless the Court is in possession of all relevant factors upon which to make its decision. Detention or imprisonment should only be used as a last resort where all other options are inappropriate, and the need for deterrence and to protect the community must be given special prominence, Yovanovic v Pryce (1985) 33 NTR 24 cited by approval by Mildren J. in Peckham v Hill No 208 of 1992, unreported 9 October 1992.

It was urged upon me by counsel for the appellant that the juvenile criminal justice system on Groote Eylandt, as implemented by Mr McCormack SM, with the cooperation of the local community and the Correctional Services Department, could provide guidance in respect of young offenders from Yuendumu.	For example, that it is inappropriate to impose punishment which will oblige juvenile aboriginal offenders to comprehend any lengthy time ahead (for example, imposing an order of detention and then suspending it upon the offender entering into a bond to be of good behaviour for, say, two years), but the appropriate form of immediate punishment is called for and to be inflicted as quickly as possible after the commission of the offence (for example, a Home Detention order or Community Service order).	I am unable to accept that proposition.	What may be appropriate for a juvenile aboriginal offender on Groote Eylandt may not be able to be automatically transplanted to such an offender at Yuendumu. There is no evidence of the relevant co-operative arrangements between government departments and members of the aboriginal

community. And, there is always the need to take into account the circumstances of the particular offender; what may be shown to be generally successful dispositions of aboriginal juveniles may not be true for all, even from the same location.

All that causes me to return to the question of the information available to his Worship.	There is nothing to indicate that his Worship had before him anything beyond that which was put in the course of submissions, and neither counsel for the respondent nor for the appellant suggested to him that the inadequacy of information might be overcome by his exercising the power under s44 of the Juvenile Justice Act to require the Minister, or such other person as he thought fit, to furnish a report relating to the appellant.	Nevertheless, it was a ground of appeal that the learned Magistrate had failed to require such a report to be furnished.	That section authorises the person from whom the report is sought to carry out enquiries and to arrange for the juvenile to be submitted to medical and other specialist attention. Reference might also be made to the general provisions as to the use to which reports ordered under s44 may be put, and the power of the Court contained in s52 to require the Minister to make an investigation where the Court believes, on reasonable grounds, that a juvenile against whom proceedings for an offence are brought, is not receiving adequate care or that his welfare is in danger in any way.	Further, the Court may require the Minister to take appropriate action to secure the proper care of and attention to the juvenile's welfare, and the Minister

is required to provide the report and furnish the Court with information as to the action that has been taken in respect of the juvenile.	It seems that there are adequate powers in the Juvenile Justice Act to divert children from the criminal justice system with a view to their being provided with proper care and attention outside that system, and thus enabling the Juvenile Court to make such disposition under s53 of the Act as is called for in the light of all of the circumstances and the steps proposed to be taken in the interests of the juvenile. Just what the Minister might do, pursuant to an order under s52 of the Juvenile Justice Act, is unclear, but the reference to the juvenile not receiving adequate care or his welfare being endangered in any way may indicate that the test to be applied before taking steps to secure his proper care and attention may be somewhat broader than those posed in the Community Welfare Act.	It is not a matter I need explore here, but the pattern of the Juvenile Justice Act would appear to not only enable the Court dealing with a juvenile, against whom proceedings for an offence are brought, to require reports, but action to be taken as preconditions to final disposition within the powers set out in s53.	I doubt that those powers are open to this Court on appeal after conviction and sentence.

Now it is true that neither counsel suggested to his Worship that a report should be ordered pursuant to s44 of the Juvenile Justice Act and thus the matter was not specifically brought to his attention. The appellant might fail upon this ground because the matter was not raised in the Court below and

ought not to be permitted to be taken in this Court on appeal. There is a need for finality in all litigation, including in relation to juvenile offenders, but that consideration must be set aside when no report has been obtained and this Court is concerned that the sentence imposed upon the juvenile may not achieve the primary objectives of sentencing in respect of juveniles.	The failure of a trial Judge to order a
pre-sentence report in respect of a 14 year old with an impressive criminal history who had pleaded guilty to rape and stealing, was one of the grounds of appeal in the matter of W before the Court of Criminal Appeal, Queensland (1990) 48 A Crim R 72, which all members of the Court, Kelly SPJ, Derrington and Carter JJ., entertained, but dismissed, not finding there had been any error in the discretion of a trial Judge.	In Manning v Police (1993) 65 A Crim R 382 Perry J. of the Supreme Court of South Australia allowed an appeal on the ground that the Magistrate should have exercised his discretion to order the preparation of a pre-sentence report where there was an unchallenged assertion that the defendant was suffering from intellectual disability.	Counsel for the appellant proffered a psychometric evaluation of the appellant, which was prepared when she was in custody serving the term of imprisonment imposed by the Magistrate, and his Honour after receiving it took it into account for the purposes of fixing the appropriate sentence after allowing the appeal.	This question was also raised in the matter of Hardy (1979) 4 A Crim R 343 before the Court of Criminal Appeal of Tasmania.	In that case at page 344 Green CJ. held that in all the circumstances it was not the sort

of case in which it was shown that the decision by the learned trial Judge not to obtain a pre-sentence report resulted in him having insufficient materials before him.	At the foot of p346, Cosgrove and Everett JJ., observed that because that particular ground "of the application is frequently made a basis of appeals to this court, it merits separate attention" and referred to the decision in Hrvojevic, unreported, Court of Criminal Appeal, Tasmania, 6 June 1979:

"Examples of the kinds of cases in which a trial judge might be obliged to obtain a pre-sentence report if the background material otherwise furnished to him is inadequate are those involving young offenders or mentally disturbed offenders and those in which the commission of the crime appears to have been completely out of character.	I use cases of that kind as examples because in such cases the possibility that the court might conclude that the individual circumstances of the offender should outweigh other more general considerations such as the need to impose a sentence of general deterrence is stronger than usual and thus the need to have full information about the personal circumstances of the offender is correspondingly increased."

There is no doubt expressed in any of those decisions that an error in the exercise of discretion to obtain more information about an offender is appellable.	I agree.	Those constituting juvenile courts should recall the powers available to obtain information in every case and make a decision as to whether a report will be ordered.	This is especially so where those representing them may not have the ability or resources to obtain all the information which may be of assistance to the Court. Reference to the appellant's

prior convictions and the disposition in respect of each of them, together with the scanty information concerning his family and other matters personal to him, was not enough upon which to base a sound discretionary judgment as to sentence.

The ability to order a report under s44 of the Juvenile Justice Act is not constrained to the Juvenile Court. Any Court dealing with a juvenile under the Act may require it. Clearly that includes this Court dealing with a juvenile at first instance (see for example ss38 - 39 of the Juvenile Justice Act) but also upon appeal (s58) since this Court sitting on such an appeal is dealing with a juvenile under the Juvenile Justice Act.	I accordingly indicated to counsel appearing in this Court that I had it in mind to make an order, but adjourned the proceedings with a view to enquiries being made as to the availability of further relevant information concerning the appellant and the time it might take to obtain.	By the time the appeal came on for hearing, the appellant was already serving the sentence the subject of the appeal.		During the adjournment, information was received by counsel for the appellant by way of facsimile transmission from the Department of Correctional Services at Alice Springs in relation to the position at Yuendumu and the appellant's personal circumstances, and from the assistant manager of the Wildman River Wilderness Camp at which the appellant was then detained. Those reports were not prepared in accordance with an order, but they tended to serve the same purpose and were received into evidence by consent.

The report from the senior Probation and Parole Officer at Alice Springs said that the supervision at Yuendumu was substantially the same as when he was offending before this matter. Unfortunately that tells me nothing about what the supervision was, but given the number of offences committed by the appellant after he was placed under supervision and the length of time it took before the fact that he was in breach of a bond was brought to the attention of the Juvenile Court at Yuendumu, it must have been deficient.	Both the appellant's parents live at Yuendumu, but his father is in a wheelchair, and it is said that they both drink.	The appellant has a large family at Yuendumu including his uncle Noel Spencer, the aboriginal Community Corrections Officer.	According to the author of the report, although the appellant did not respond to supervision before, it is possible that the period of detention may have shaken him out of his previous "don't care" attitude.	In his favour, he was not known to be a petrol sniffer which is a problem at Yuendumu.		There are community service order projects available in that area, but the appellant had breached an order to that effect just prior to his period of detention.	That must have been a continuation of the 80 hours of community service which he was ordered to carry out after his conviction on 28 April 1993.	Attempts were made to place him with relations at outstations, but they failed, part of the problem being that there are no schools or peers there.	Prior to his detention, that is, in December 1993, he is said to have refused to attend school or adult

education and was not listening to his parents, and it is reported that he was telling his relations that he wanted to do some detention.	It was noted that not long after he was released from the period of three months detention imposed on
23 June 1993, he re-offended with violence against a young woman, for which he was sentenced to the four months detention, for which part of the sentence the subject of this appeal was ordered to be served concurrently.

The report from the Assistant Manager of the Wilderness Camp says that the appellant has developed considerably since arriving there, and his attitude to detention can only be described as positive, especially when reflecting upon the earlier difficulties he had when adjusting to the Camp requirements (presumably this refers to the attempts he made to harm himself). He does not possess any specific talents or skills, but shows persistence and a willingness to learn mainly routine and simple tasks.	He requires supervision when working at machinery or wanting to drive the tractor.	He is not physically active, and the education programme is his favourite interest.	He is said to be easy to work with, and there are no major disciplinary problems, although he needs to be reminded of his duties now and then.	He maintains a low, but well behaved profile complying with Camp requirements, and according to the author, he has utilised his natural abilities to explore new and beneficial fields to aid in his re-education.		That information is indicative of progress towards the appellant's

rehabilitation, but it is of concern that prior to his being sentenced to detention in December last a variety of means to assist him had been tried unsuccessfully.

The information now available is an improvement upon that before his Worship.		It is not enough, but I am pleased that those responsible acted with alacrity to provide it in such a short time.	I would like to know more about the appellant and current conditions at Yuendumu, especially concerning supervision and prospects for further education to fit his needs.	There is a degree of optimism in the report from Wildman River, and it will be important that there be follow ups so that the appellant will be offered the chance to continue in the community what has been begun in detention.	It is apparent that his Worship's sentencing discretion miscarried, even on the material before him.	Bearing in mind the appellant's age, that this was his first offence for unlawful use of a motor vehicle (a serious example though it was), that he was trying to return home after unsuccessfully endeavouring to do so lawfully, that the offence for which he was then on detention was quite unrelated and occurred after the day he committed this offence, the sentence of seven months detention concurrent as to four months with the other sentence, was manifestly excessive.	He was, however, an offender with a bad record of dishonesty and his venture was not a simple joy ride, but one involving a prospective journey of approximately 290 kilometres, much of it on unsealed road.

As already indicated, his Worship also erred in the principles he applied in deciding that the appellant should be kept in detention under a criminal justice system for further education.	He also erred in failing to seek further information concerning the appellant.

The sentence of seven months detention is quashed and in lieu thereof the appellant is sentenced to three months detention (in a juvenile detention centre approved by the Minister under s62) cumulative upon the sentence of four months detention imposed on 11 December 1993.	That sentence will be suspended after 6 weeks from its commencement upon the appellant entering into a bond, in his own recognizance in the sum of $10, that he will be of good behaviour for a period of six months, and that he will accept the supervision and reasonable directions as to his place of residence, further education and vocational training of a person appointed by the Director of Correctional Services.	It will be necessary to ensure that the appellant understands the undertaking and consequences for its breach.	Importantly, as well, will be the selection of a person to undertake the supervision.	This Court's orders and directions must not be rendered futile.

The appeal against the order disqualifying the appellant from driving or obtaining a driver's license must succeed, if for no other reason than that it was imposed without giving the appellant any opportunity to be heard on the point. It is necessary that the Juvenile Court pay regard to all the

facts and circumstances before it, and be satisfied that the juvenile is not a fit and proper person to hold such a license, before making such an order (s53A(1)).		Counsel for the respondent quite properly conceded it.	The order is quashed and in all the circumstances I find no good reason to make any order in substitution for it.	Being properly trained in regard to driving and obtaining a license may open up opportunities which will assist in the appellant's rehabilitation.