ABB Australia Pty Ltd v CH2M Hill Australia Pty Limited & Ors [2017] NTSC 1

PARTIES:	ABB Australia Pty Ltd 
	(ABN 68 003 337 611)

	v
	
	CH2M Hill Australia Pty Limited 
	(ABN 42 050 070 892)

	and

	UGL Engineering Pty Limited 
	(ABN 96 096 365 972)

	and

	KIRKPATRICK, Neil

TITLE OF COURT:	SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY

JURISDICTION:	SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY EXERCISING TERRITORY JURISDICTION

FILE NO:	81 of 2016 (21635965)

DELIVERED:	13 JANUARY 2017

HEARING DATES:	22 SEPTEMBER 2016

JUDGMENT OF:	KELLY J

CATCHWORDS:

Construction Contracts (Security of Payments) Act 2004 (NT) (“the Act”) s 48(1) – application under s 48(1) to set aside adjudicator’s determination under s 33(1)(a) to dismiss an application for adjudication without making a determination on the merits - by consent referred to the Supreme Court pursuant to s 18 of the Local Court (Civil Procedure) Act 2015 (NT) 

Applicant sub-contractor served payment claim on respondent in respect of money said to be owing under a construction contract – applicant in breach of security requirement in the contract – respondent replied by letter requiring applicant to resubmit its payment claim for certification by respondent after provision of replacement security – applicant provided replacement security and resubmitted payment claim in identical terms – respondent replied certifying a lesser amount payable under the contract but claimed to set off that amount against liquidated damages – applicant applied for adjudication under s 28 of the Act – adjudicator appointed

Applicant and respondent both agreed that first payment claim not a valid payment claim under the contract - adjudicator held that though the first payment claim was not a valid payment claim under the contract it was a valid payment claim under the Act – therefore a payment dispute arose when respondent replied by letter requiring applicant to resubmit payment claim after provision of alternative security – adjudicator held application not made within 90 days after payment dispute arose – adjudicator dismissed claim under s 33(1)(a) without making a determination on the merits

Held first payment claim not a valid payment claim under the Act – validity of payment claim to be determined by reference to the contract - therefore letter requiring applicant to resubmit payment claim after provision of alternative security did not give rise to a payment dispute within the meaning of s 8 of the Act – therefore application not made more than 90 days after payment dispute arose - appeal allowed

Duties of adjudicator - adjudicator obliged to determine whether there is a “payment dispute” and, if so whether it arose not more than 90 days before the making of the application – this requires the adjudicator to look at the terms of the contract and consider whether what purports to be a payment claim is capable of giving rise to a liability on the part of the principal to pay – if not there is no “payment dispute” and the adjudicator is required by s 33(1)(a) to dismiss the application without a determination on the merits

Construction Contracts (Security of Payments) Act 2004 (NT), s 8, s 28(1), s 33, s 48

K & J Burns Electrical Pty Ltd v GRD Group (NT) Pty Ltd (2011) 29 NTLR 1; [2011] NTCA 1, Trans Australian Constructions Pty Ltd v Nilsen (SA) Pty Ltd (2008) 23 NTLR 123; [2008] NTSC 42, relied on

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:
	Applicant:	A Wyvill SC with W Roper
	First and Second Respondents:	R Fenwick Elliott

Solicitors:
	Applicant:	De Silva Hebron
	First and Second Respondents:	Squire Patton Boggs (AU)

Judgment category classification:	B
Judgment ID Number:	KEL1701
Number of pages:	20

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
OF AUSTRALIA
AT DARWIN

ABB Australia Pty Ltd v CH2M Hill Australia Pty Limited & Ors [2017] NTSC 1
No. 81 of 2016 (21635965)

	BETWEEN:

	ABB AUSTRALIA PTY LTD 
	(ABN 68 003 337 611)
	Applicant

	AND:

	CH2M HILL AUSTRALIA PTY LIMITED (ABN 42 050 070 892)
	First Respondent

	AND:

	UGL ENGINEERING PTY LIMITED 
	(ABN 96 096 365 972)
		Second Respondent

		AND:

		NEIL KIRKPATRICK
		Third Respondent

CORAM:	KELLY J

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(Delivered 13 January 2017)

Background
[1]	On 17 July 2014, the first and second respondents, as joint venturers, and the applicant entered into a construction contract (“the Contract”) under which the applicant was to supply to the joint venture major equipment for the combined cycle power plant at the Ichthys Onshore LNG Facilities at Bladin Point near Darwin.  (The first and second respondents as joint venturers [referred to in the Contract as “CH2-UGL JV”] are referred to in this judgment as “the respondent”.)
[2]	On 7 March 2016, the applicant served on the respondent a payment claim [PC-009 Rev 2] claiming payment of $2,418,603.99 (plus GST) for certain work within the scope of the Contract and for “Change Orders” two to six.  On 15 March 2016 the respondent issued a payment certificate under the Contract for $908,047.14 of that amount which it then set off against its claim for liquidated damages.  On 10 June 2016 the applicant made application under s 28 of the Construction Contracts (Security of Payments) Act 2004 (NT) (the “Act”) to have the payment dispute adjudicated (“Application 1”) and the third respondent, Mr Neil Kirkpatrick, was appointed as the adjudicator.
[3]	On 11 July 2016, the adjudicator dismissed Application 1 under s 33(1)(a) of the Act on the ground that the payment dispute had in fact arisen on 2 March 2016 and Application 1 had not been made within 90 days as required by s 28(1) (“Determination 1”).
[4]	The applicant has applied under s 48(1) of the Act to set aside the adjudicator’s determination under s 33(1)(a) to dismiss Application 1 without making a determination on the merits and is seeking an order under s 48(2) of the Act referring Application 1 back to the third respondent to be determined under s 33(1)(b).  By consent the matter was referred to the Supreme Court pursuant to s 18 of the Local Court (Civil Procedure) Act 2015 (NT) and listed before me. 
The Facts
[5]	On 19 February 2016 the applicant sent the respondent a payment claim, PC-009 Rev 1, dated 19 February 2016 claiming payment of $2,418,603.99.
[6]	By letter dated 2 March 2016, the respondent advised the applicant that the applicant was in breach of the security requirement in cl 14 of the Contract and as a result had not met a condition precedent to the right to deliver a payment claim under cl 12 of the Contract.  The letter advised that “(f)ollowing replacement of the Security, (the applicant) is required to resubmit its payment claim for certification by (the respondent) in accordance with Contract clause 12”.
[7]	The applicant provided the security required under cl 14 of the Contract and on 7 March 2016 sent a payment claim, PC-009 Rev 2, dated 7 March 2016, to the respondent.  Apart from the change of date, PC-009 Rev 2 was in the same terms as PC-009 Rev 1.
[8]	On 15 March 2016, the respondent responded certifying that of the amount of $2,418,603.99 claimed, $908,047.14 was payable under the Contract, but claiming to set off the whole of that amount against liquidated damages said to be owing by the applicant to the respondent.  On that basis, the respondent advised that it would not be making any payment on PC-009 Rev 2.
[9]	On 10 June 2016, the applicant made Application 1 and the third respondent was appointed as adjudicator. 
[10]	On 23 June 2016, the respondent delivered its response (“the Response”) in which it submitted that the adjudicator should dismiss the application under s 33(1)(a) relying on a number of not presently relevant grounds.  The grounds relied upon by the respondent did not include a contention that the Application had not been brought within time on the basis that a payment dispute had arisen on the rejection of PC-009 Rev 1 by the letter of 2 March 2016. 
[11]	On 4 July 2016, the adjudicator sought further submissions in relation to two issues.  The first issue was a contention by the respondent that PC-009 Rev 2 was not a valid payment claim under the Contract and is not presently relevant.  The second issue raised by the adjudicator was this. 
I request the parties provide me with submissions on the following:
(a)	whether the purported payment claim reference PC-009 Rev 1, as referred to by the Applicant, was a valid payment claim for the purposes of the Construction Contracts (Security of Payment) (sic) Act; and
(b)	whether the Respondents (sic) letter [of 2 March 2016] provides for an agreement between the parties for the re-submission of a payment claim under the contract that has subsequently given rise to an entitlement to make an application for adjudication under the Construction Contracts (Security of Payment) (sic) Act.
[12]	The applicant’s solicitors provided their submissions on 5 July 2016.  In relation to the second issue raised by the adjudicator, they agreed with the respondent’s earlier submission (set out in the Response) that the provision of security is a pre-condition to a valid payment claim under the Contract and that, therefore, PC-009 Rev 1 was not a valid payment claim.  They also submitted that if the adjudicator did not accept that position, the letter of 2 March 2016 “provides for an agreement between the parties for the re-submission of a payment claim under the Contract that has subsequently given rise to an entitlement to make an application for adjudication under the Act”.  They added that the respondent had advanced the position that PC-009 Rev 1 was not a valid payment claim in the letter of 2 March 2016 and is estopped from subsequently resiling from that position, and that the applicant had relied on the direction to submit a new payment claim and would suffer detriment if the respondent were now to adopt a different approach.
[13]	The respondent’s solicitors also provided their submissions on 5 July 2016.  They confirmed the respondent’s position that PC-009 Rev 1 was not a valid payment claim for the purposes of the Act.  In relation to the second part of the adjudicator’s query, they advanced the following contention.
[W]hile the 2 March Letter contemplated that [the applicant] could resubmit PC-009 Rev 1, this should not be construed purely as ‘an agreement between the parties for the re-submission of a payment claim under the contract’.  Rather, the letter should be understood as [the respondent] rejecting PC-009 Rev 1 as [the applicant] had not complied with the terms of the Contract when submitting its payment claim.
[14]	The adjudicator handed down his decision on 11 July 2016.  In it, he rejected each of the jurisdictional arguments put by the respondent, but nevertheless dismissed the application without making a determination on the merits on the ground that it was not prepared and served in accordance with s 28(1) of the Act.  The basis of the decision was that the payment dispute had in fact arisen on 2 March 2016 on the rejection of PC-009 Rev 1 and Application 1 had not been made within 90 days as required by s 28(1).
[15]	In doing so, the adjudicator held that even though PC-009 Rev 1 was not a valid payment claim under the Contract, it was nevertheless a valid payment claim under the Act.  He referred back to an earlier part of Determination 1 in which he had considered a contention by the respondent that he should dismiss the application without making a determination on the merits because PC-009 Rev 2 did not comply with the requirements for a payment claim under the Contract.  In rejecting that contention, the adjudicator relied on paras [48] to [51] of the dissenting judgment of Southwood J in K & J Burns Electrical Pty Ltd v GRD Group (NT) Pty Ltd (“K & J Burns”) and paras [67] to [72] of the judgment of Southwood J in Trans Australian Constructions Pty Ltd v Nilsen (SA) Pty Ltd (“Transcon”) in which his Honour made a distinction between a valid payment claim under a contract and a “payment claim” for the purposes of the Act.  In relation to PC-009 Rev 2, the adjudicator concluded:
The defect in the Payment Claim alleged by the Respondents was in relation to the time it was to be submitted and when this issue is considered context (sic) with the extract above [ie the paras from K & J Burns and Transcon referred to above], it could not relate to a jurisdictional error but goes to whether there was a contractual right to payment on foot of a payment claim made, it goes to the merits of the Payment Claim and not a matter of jurisdiction under the Act.
[16]	In considering PC-009 Rev 1, the adjudicator said:  
It follows that it would be inconsistent to consider the payment claim submitted on 19 February 2016 in a different way to the Payment Claim in this adjudication.  …  [I]t therefore must be considered a payment claim for the purposes of the Act, because there was a contractual defect at time of submission which was not relevant for establishing its validity under the Act.
The adjudicator characterised the letter of 2 March 2016 as “a manifest rejection of a payment claim that has been established as being valid under the Act”.  As PC-009 Rev 1 was in identical terms to PC-009 Rev 2, he found that the payment dispute in relation to that payment claim arose on 2 March 2016.  Hence Application 1, made on 10 June 2016, was made more than 90 days after the payment dispute arose and was out of time.  
[17]	The respondent and applicant agree that PC-009 Rev 1 was not a valid payment claim under the Contract, at least one (the respondent says two) contractual conditions precedent to payment not having been met. 
[18]	The applicant contends that it follows that the adjudicator was in error in determining that a payment dispute had arisen on 2 March 2016.  The applicant relies on the majority decision in K & J Burns for the proposition that to give rise to a payment dispute within the meaning of s 8 of the Act, what purports to be a payment claim must comply with the requirements for making a payment claim under the contract in question.  
[19]	The respondent contends that it does not follow that PC-009 Rev 1 was not a payment claim under the Act, for the purpose of triggering a payment dispute within the meaning of s 8; that if a claim for payment is made and rejected, then a dispute has arisen.  It may well be the dispute in question is one that the claimant will lose (assuming a competent adjudicator) because the payment claim suffers from a contractual flaw, such as the non-fulfilment of a condition precedent, such that the claim is not, in that sense, a valid claim.  But the respondent contends that it is nonsensical to suggest that such a flaw would take such a payment claim out of the scope of s 8.
[20]	Hence the respondent contends that the precise claim in PC-009 Rev 2 having been rejected on 2 March 2016, a payment dispute in relation to that claim arose on that date.  Therefore the application for adjudication lodged on 10 June 2016 was not made within 90 days after the dispute arose as required under s 28(1) and, the adjudicator was right to dismiss it without making a determination on the merits under s 33(1)(a).
[21]	I do not agree.  In my view the adjudicator was in error in concluding that PC-009 Rev 1 was a valid payment claim under the Act and that the letter of 2 March 2016 gave rise to a payment dispute in relation to that claim.  The decision of the majority of the Court of Appeal in K & J Burns is clear authority against the line of reasoning adopted by the adjudicator and relied on by the respondent.  
[22]	In K & J Burns, Olsson AJ referred to a submission by counsel for the defendant in that case that to constitute a valid payment claim for the purposes of the Act, all that needed to be established was that a claim had been made to the principal for payment of an amount of money in respect of works performed under a construction contract.  The contention by the defendant was that any contractual requirements beyond that did not go to the fundamental question of jurisdiction.  Rather, they were matters an adjudicator would have regard to in making a determination as to whether the amount claimed was in fact due and payable under the contract.  This was said to be consistent with the same dictum of Southwood J in Transcon relied on by the adjudicator (and the respondent) in this case.  Olsson JA rejected that contention.  He said:
[231]	With respect, it seems to me that to state the approach of [the defendant] in the above terms is to immediately reveal certain problems inherent in it.
[232]	It is tantamount to asserting that any specific contractual provisions regulating how and when moneys are to become payable under a construction contract are irrelevant to the question of when a party to that contract may raise what can properly be categorised as a payment claim, with a view to generating a payment dispute, that is, the statute confers jurisdiction on an adjudicator to adjudicate a claim in any case in which a claim is made for payment of moneys in relation to a construction contract, there being no requirement to even prima facie relate a payment claim to any specific contractual pre-requisites for such payment.
[233]	On that argument such pre-requisites only become relevant merits considerations after the adjudicator actually embarks upon the process of adjudication.
[234]	In my opinion such an approach has the practical effect of ignoring the existence and significance of the word “under” in the statutory definition of “payment claim”.
[235]	According to its normal English connotation, that word signifies “in accordance with”, “governed or controlled or bound by”, “on condition of” or “subject to”, to list but a few of the many applicable dictionary expressions of meaning.
[236]	Applying the concepts of such meanings to the relevant definition in s 4 of the statute, the clear intent of the definition is that, to constitute a payment claim, the claim must be shown to be a claim for moneys in accordance with or subject to the conditions of a construction contract.
[237]	In other words, it is not merely a claim at large in respect of works under a construction contract, it must be one that can properly be categorised as a genus of claim provided for by that contract. The existence of a mere causal nexus with a construction contract is plainly not what is in contemplation by the legislation.
[238]	Moreover, as a matter of simple logic, a dispute can only arise under s 8 of the statute when a payment claim is properly said to be due to be paid under the relevant construction contract and has been disputed and/or not fully paid. That situation can only arise in relation to a payment claim that purports to be of a genus recognised and provided for by the contract, that is, in the instant case, one that, on the face of it, complies with and answers the description in the mandatory provisions of cl 12.2 of the sub-contract.
[239]	The statutory construction embraced by Mr Roper would ignore the real significance of the specific contractual terms and conditions negotiated by the parties, in the sense that a principal could be compulsorily drawn into an adjudication without the claimant having demonstrated any prima facie basis of potential liability to pay in accordance with the contract.
[240]	Whilst the statute certainly sets out to cater for contractual relationships that are not prescriptive in detail and, in effect, provides an implied series of terms in absence of relevant contractual provisions, it also recognises the fact that many commercial contracts contain rigorous and highly prescriptive pre-conditions for the making of valid payment claims and also for payment.
[241]	Indeed, as was pointed out on the hearing of the appeal, compliance with the implied statutory provisions to which s 19 directs its attention, where applicable, is expressed by that section to be mandatory. It would be strange if, despite such a requirement, compliance with contractual conditions pre-requisite to the raising of a valid payment claim were held to be non-essential to the proper characterisation of a valid payment claim, for the purposes of the statute.
[23]	In K & J Burns I agreed with the reasoning of Olsson AJ in those passages.  I also made the following remarks in relation to those parts of the judgment of Southwood J in Transcon relied on by the adjudicator :
[112]	Counsel for the respondent submitted that the effect of this was that the adjudicator was faced with a two-stage process. First he must ascertain whether what was produced to him as a payment claim fulfilled the criteria set out in Transcon. If so, the adjudicator was obliged to accept it as such and to embark upon a consideration of the application. It was only at the stage of considering the application on its merits that the adjudicator would turn to the contract to see if the purported payment claim complied with the requirements of the contract for a payment claim.
[113]	There is nothing in the Act which gives support to that submission, or to the notion that the adjudicator should engage in a two-stage process of that kind. The Act is quite clear. The question which the adjudicator must address is whether the application was made within 90 days of a payment dispute arising (s 28). To determine when a payment dispute arises, the adjudicator must look at when the amount claimed was due under the contract (s 8).
[114]	The above submission takes the remarks of Southwood J in Transcon out of context. Those remarks were made in the course of rejecting a submission that for there to be a valid determination by an adjudicator, there must in fact have been a valid payment claim under the contract – that is, a submission that for the adjudicator to have jurisdiction, he must have got that question right. Southwood J rightly rejected that submission, and at [66] and [67], he was attempting to delineate an area beyond which an adjudicator would be failing to observe an essential pre-condition for the exercise of his power if he accepted something as a payment claim.
[115]	Those “requirements” would in any case be subject to the provisions of the actual contract between the parties, since s 8 of the Act provides that a payment dispute arises “when the amount claimed in a payment claim is due to be paid under the contract [and] the amount has not been paid in full or the claim has been rejected or wholly or partly disputed”; and a “payment claim” is defined (relevantly) as a claim made under a construction contract by the contractor to the principal for payment of an amount in relation to the performance by the contractor of its obligations under the contract: s 4 of the Act.
[116]	If a construction contract contains a written provision about payment claims, the Act defines “payment claim” by reference to the terms of the construction contract actually made by the parties: s 4 of the Act. It is to that contract that the adjudicator must go to determine whether there is a “payment claim” and hence a “payment dispute” for him to adjudicate. If the construction contract does not contain such a written provision, the Act implies into the contract the relevant contractual provisions in the schedule of the Act. While it is highly unlikely in practice that a given contract would provide for payment claims to be made under the contract in a manner that does not fulfil all of the requirements set out at [67] of Southwood J’s judgment in Transcon, it is theoretically possible for a contract to specify, for example, the making of an oral payment claim, in which case the provisions of the contract would prevail. Nevertheless, in the ordinary run of cases, in contracts containing the usual sorts of provisions for making payment claims, a decision by an adjudicator that a payment claim which failed to meet requirements 1, 2, 4 and 5 set out at [67], or was known to the adjudicator to be fraudulent, is likely to be so unreasonable as to render the purported decision and resulting determination a nullity – and hence subject to review by this court.
[117]	If the quoted remarks of Southwood J were to be understood in the sense contended for by the respondent, then I agree with the submission by the appellant that they ought not be followed. It would not be necessary to overrule Transcon (Ground of Appeal 2.1A) as these remarks are in any event obiter.
[24]	I said, further:
[147]	If it had been necessary to deal with the other grounds of appeal, I would also be forced to disagree with Southwood J’s finding that the adjudicator misconstrued the definition of ‘payment claim’ in s 4 of the Act. Southwood J expresses the view that the definition of payment claim in s 4 of the Act does not require that a payment claim must strictly comply with the express terms of the contract and that, accordingly, a payment claim is any claim made for payment of an amount for work performed by virtue of a construction contract.
[148]	In my respectful opinion, this analysis confuses two very different questions – what the adjudicator is required to do by the Act, and the separate question of what kind of error will render an adjudicator’s decision void and thereby amenable to review by the Supreme Court.
[149]	So far as the adjudicator is concerned, in order to determine whether a payment dispute has arisen (and, if so, when) he is required to determine whether what is presented to him as a payment claim complies with the requirements of the contract in question (or whether it is payable under the contract even if non-compliant, for example, because of the absence of a prescribed notice of dispute). 
[150]	Southwood J has cited his own decision in Transcon as supporting the proposition that a payment claim need not conform to the requirements of the contract to be a valid payment claim under the Act. In my view Transcon does not support that proposition. The point in Transcon was whether an error by the adjudicator in deciding that question would render his determination void: Southwood J held that it would not. That is a very different question from whether the adjudicator is obliged to accept as a payment claim, for all purposes, anything that purports to be a claim for payment for work performed under a construction contract, regardless of the requirements of the contract.
[151]	It simply cannot be right that an adjudicator must accept as a valid payment claim anything which happens to be a claim for payment for an amount of work performed by virtue of a construction contract, regardless of the requirements of the particular contract for making such claims, and I respectfully agree with the reasons of Olsson A-J at paragraphs [231] - [239] for rejecting the argument to this effect put forward by the respondent.
[25]	These passages from the judgments of the two judges who formed the majority in K & J Burns, it seems to me, are fatal to the contentions of the respondent.  Further explanation is desirable in the context of this case.  I consider that the concepts of “jurisdiction” and “jurisdictional error” used by the adjudicator in this context are misplaced.  It is more helpful to focus on what the Act requires the adjudicator to do.
[26]	Section 33(1)(a) provides that an adjudicator must dismiss the application without making a determination of its merits if one (or more) of the matters in s 33(1)(a)(i) to (iv) are made out.  Otherwise, he is to determine on the balance of probabilities whether any party to the payment dispute is liable to make a payment (or to return any security).
[27]	Focusing on s 33(1)(a)(ii), the adjudicator must dismiss the application without making a determination of its merits if the application has not been prepared and served in accordance with s 28.  That requires the adjudicator to determine whether the formal requirements for preparing and serving the application have been satisfied.  It also requires the adjudicator to determine whether there is a “payment dispute” and, if so, whether it arose not more than 90 days before the making of the application.
[28]	Section 8 of the Act provides:
A payment dispute arises if: 
(a)	a payment claim has been made under a contract and either: 
(i)	the claim has been rejected or wholly or partly disputed; or 
(ii)	when the amount claimed is due to be paid, the amount has not been paid in full; or 
(b)	when an amount retained by a party under the contract is due to be paid under the contract, the amount has not been paid; or 
(c)	when any security held by a party under the contract is due to be returned under the contract, the security has not been returned. 
[29]	Section 4 provides:
“payment claim” means a claim made under a construction contract: 
(a)	by the contractor to the principal for payment of an amount in relation to the performance by the contractor of its obligations under the contract; or 
(b)	by the principal to the contractor for payment of an amount in relation to the performance or non-performance by the contractor of its obligations under the contract. 
[30]	In the case of a claim by a contractor, in order to determine whether a payment dispute has arisen, the adjudicator must first determine whether the contractor has made a claim under the contract for payment of an amount in relation to the performance by the contractor of its obligations under the contract.  This necessarily entails the adjudicator going to the terms of the contract and asking whether what purports to be a payment claim is capable of giving rise to a liability on the part of the principal to pay.  If not, then there is no “payment dispute” and the adjudicator is required by s 33(1)(a) to dismiss the application without a determination on the merits.
[31]	The respondent contends that it is nonsensical to suggest that there is no payment dispute in such circumstances; that there is a payment dispute – albeit one which the applicant may be bound to lose because the payment claim suffers from a contractual flaw.
[32]	I do not agree, and it seems to me that the objective of s 33(1)(a) is to apply to just such a situation.  If a claim for payment is incapable, under the contract, of giving rise to a liability to pay, then there is no point in an adjudicator looking into the underlying merits of the contractor’s claim to be entitled to payment for performance of its obligations under the contract.  It would be a waste of time and money.  Hence s 33(1)(a) of the Act directs the adjudicator, in those circumstances, to dismiss the application without enquiring into those underlying merits.
[33]	Of course a dispute may arise as to the adequacy of a particular form of request for payment under a contract, but it is not nonsensical not to characterise such a dispute as a “payment dispute” within the meaning of the Act.  A “payment dispute” arises out of a “payment claim” and is therefore, in the case of a claim by a contractor, a dispute about whether an amount is owing in relation to the performance by the contractor of its obligations under the contract (to use the words of s 4) – rather than a dispute about whether a particular form of payment request is capable of giving rise to a liability to make a payment. 
[34]	That is not to say (as the respondent submitted) that an adjudicator has no jurisdiction to determine a dispute about the validity under the contract of what purports to be a payment claim.  The Act requires the adjudicator to make such a determination.  It is just that it requires him to make it at the stage of deciding under s 33(1)(a) whether to dismiss the application without proceeding to a determination on the merits of the underlying claim. 
[35]	Accordingly, the fact (as was common ground) that PC-009 Rev 1 was not a valid or complying payment claim under the contract means that it could not give rise to a payment dispute within the meaning of the Act; the letter of 2 March 2016 did not have that effect; and the 90 day time limit in s 28 of the Act for making application for an adjudication did not start to run on 2 March 2016.  
[36]	It is therefore not necessary for me to decide whether there was an agreement between the parties for the provision of a repeat claim which could trigger a fresh payment dispute or whether the respondent is estopped from asserting that a payment dispute arose on 2 March 2016.  (The estoppel originally contended for was that the respondent is estopped from contending that PC-009 Rev 1 was a valid payment claim under the Contract, but both parties agreed that it was not.)
[37]	Nor is it necessary for me to come to any concluded view as to the nature of the review conferred by s 48(1).  Section 48 provides:
(1)	A person who is aggrieved by a decision made under section 33(1)(a) may apply to the Local Court for a review of the decision. 
(2)	If, on the review, the decision is set aside and referred back to the adjudicator, the adjudicator must make a determination under section 33(1)(b) within 10 working days after the date on which the decision is set aside or any extension of that time agreed on by the parties. 
(3)	Except as provided by subsection (1), a decision or determination of an adjudicator on an adjudication cannot be appealed or reviewed. 
[38]	Given the objects of the legislation, the strict time limits in the Act for supplying material to an adjudicator and the limited material an adjudicator can take into account, as well as the fact that review is only available in respect of a decision under s 33(1)(a) – ie one to dismiss an application without proceeding to a determination on the merits – I incline to the view that what was intended was a review on the merits on the material before the adjudicator only.  However, this is not a case where the precise nature of the review is at issue.  What is alleged (and has been found) is an error of law on the part of the adjudicator.  Whatever the exact nature of and limits on the review process, it would encompass an error of law.
[39]	The respondent made a rather half-hearted submission that “review” should be construed as “judicial review” on the ground that the legislature could not have intended to give the Local Court greater powers of review under the Act than the Supreme Court had.  However, this is simply not consistent with the words of the section.  Sub-section 48(1) gives a power of review to the Local Court in relation to a decision under s 33(1)(a).  Sub-section 48(3) provides that there is no review for any other decision.  It is self-evident that the “review” under s 48(1) must be wider than “no review” under s 48(3).  The power of judicial review which the Supreme Court retains, it retains despite s 48(3) in circumstances where, because of the nature of the error, there is no effective “decision or determination of an adjudicator”.

[40]	I make the following declarations.
(a)	PC-009 Rev 1 was not a valid payment claim under the Act.
(b)	The letter of 2 March 2016 did not give rise to a payment dispute within the meaning of s 8 of the Act.
[41]	I will hear the parties as to the appropriate orders to be made.